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THE CIVIL REDRESS AND HISTORICAL MEMORY ACT OF
2029: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
William J. Aceves*

ABSTRACT
During the extant “War on Terror,” U.S. and foreign nationals who did not
engage in hostilities were detained and mistreated abroad by the United States or by
other countries with the acquiescence of the United States. These individuals were
accused of being terrorists or were suspected of associating with terror groups, but
they were, in fact, innocent. They were eventually released and were never charged
by the United States with any crime. Despite their innocence, the United States has
failed to provide them with any form of redress for their mistreatment. The Bush,
Obama, and Trump administrations refused to apologize or provide any reparations to these individuals. The federal courts have consistently dismissed their
efforts to seek redress through legal process. And, to date, Congress has remained
silent.
To remedy these acts of injustice, this Article offers a legislative proposal based
on the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which Congress adopted to address the discrimination and detention of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. Based
on this historical analog, this Article proposes the adoption of the Civil Redress and
Historical Memory Act of 2029, which would establish a commission of inquiry to
investigate these cases of arbitrary detention and mistreatment perpetrated by the
United States during the War on Terror. The Act would offer an apology and
provide restitution to individuals who were wrongfully detained and mistreated by
the United States or by other countries with U.S. complicity during the War on
Terror. The Act would also establish a public education program that would publicize the commission’s findings and promote awareness of human rights in the
United States and abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
The stories of the abducted share much in common. While taken
from different locations around the world and subjected to various
forms of abuse, they were all accused by the United States of being
terrorists or were suspected of associating with terror groups in the
extant “War on Terror.”1 And yet, they were all innocent.
Khaled El-Masri, a German national, was captured while visiting
Macedonia on a short vacation.2 Macedonian officials detained him
without charge under the mistaken belief that he was an Al Qaeda
terrorist. After three weeks, El-Masri was transferred to U.S. custody
and was beaten, drugged, and then transported from Macedonia to
Afghanistan. He was detained at the “Salt Pit,” an infamous “black
1.
The term “War on Terror” is used in this Article with some trepidation to describe
the ongoing conflict against terrorism that began after September 11, 2001. Its use is not
meant to suggest that terrorism requires a military solution or that the United States has
adhered to the constitutional requirements for declaring war under the U.S. Constitution.
Not surprisingly, the use of this term is contested. See ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME
WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON 29 (2016); ADAM
HODGES, THE WAR ON TERROR NARRATIVE: DISCOURSE AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND CONTESTATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL REALITY (2011); Stephen D. Reese & Seth C.
Lewis, Framing the War on Terror: The Internalization of Policy in the U.S. Press, 10 JOURNALISM 777
(2009); Michael Isikoff, Why Obama May Abandon “War on Terror” Phrase, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 3,
2009, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-obama-may-abandon-war-terror-phrase82181.
2.
See infra Part II(A).
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site” operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for four
months without charge. When CIA officials finally acknowledged
that they had abducted and tortured an innocent man, they flew ElMasri to Albania and released him on an abandoned road. They
told him to walk away without turning back.
Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, was detained by U.S. government officials in New York during a flight layover.3 At the time, he
was returning to Canada after a family vacation in Tunisia. Identified by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a
suspected terrorist, Arar was transferred to Syria despite serious
concerns that he would be tortured. Soon after he arrived in Syria,
Arar was tortured by Syrian officials. For almost a year, he remained
in custody. Arar was eventually released by Syria, which found no
connection between him and any terrorist or criminal organizations. Under diplomatic escort, Arar returned to Canada. Neither
Canada nor the United States ever charged Arar with any crime. He
was innocent.
Amir Meshal, a U.S. citizen, was initially detained in Kenya.4 He
was first rendered to Somalia and then Ethiopia with the acquiescence of U.S. officials. For over three months, U.S. officials
interrogated him and accused him of being a terrorist. He was denied all forms of judicial process and was threatened with torture if
he did not cooperate and confess his connections to Al Qaeda.
Meshal was finally released by Ethiopian officials and allowed to return to the United States. Despite the allegations made against him,
the United States never charged him with a crime. He was also
innocent.
These individuals, and many others like them, share another attribute. Despite their innocence, they were denied any form of
redress for their detention and mistreatment by the United States.5
The Bush and Obama administrations did not apologize or provide
any reparations to these individuals. The Trump administration has
taken the same approach. The federal courts have consistently dismissed efforts to seek redress through the legal process.6 And, to
3.
See infra Part II(B).
4.
See infra Part II(C).
5.
See Conor Friedersdorf, Former State Department Official: Team Bush Knew Many at
Gitmo Were Innocent, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2013/04/former-state-department-official-team-bush-knew-many-at-gitmo-were-innocent/
275327/; see also MURAT KURNAZ WITH HELMUT KUHN, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT
MAN IN GUANTANAMO (Jefferson Chase trans., 2008) (2007); Murat Kurnaz, Notes from a Guantanamo Survivor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/
sunday/notes-from-a-guantanamo-survivor.html.
6.
See generally William J. Aceves, Constitutional Barriers and the Perils of Impunity, in LESSONS AND LEGACIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR: FROM MORAL PANIC TO PERMANENT WAR 49
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date, Congress has stayed silent. Impunity remains because no one
has been held accountable for these abuses.7
In response, this Article offers a legislative proposal that acknowledges the injustices suffered by these individuals and provides them
with redress.8 Part II tells the stories of three individuals—Khaled
El-Masri, Maher Arar, and Amir Meshal—who did not engage in
hostilities during the War on Terror and were neither terrorists nor
associated with any terror groups. These individuals were detained
and mistreated abroad by the United States or by other countries
with the complicity of the United States. They were eventually released and were never charged by the United States with any crime.
Despite their innocence, their efforts to seek redress from the
United States have been unsuccessful. Indeed, the United States
has refused to acknowledge any aspect of their detention or mistreatment despite clear evidence that these individuals were
detained and abused. Part III of this Article provides a historical
analog by reviewing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which Congress
adopted to offer an apology and reparations to Japanese Americans

(Gershon Shafir et al. eds., 2013); Jeffrey Davis, Uncloaking Secrecy: International Human Rights
Law in Terrorism Cases, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 58, 67 (2016); Developments in the Law—Compensating
Victims of Wrongful Detention, Torture, and Abuse in the U.S. War on Terror, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1158 (2009); Jameel Jaffer, Known Unknowns, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 470 (2013);
Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625 (2010);
Daniel Joseph Natalie, Note, No Longer Secret: Overcoming the State Secrets Privilege to Explore
Meaningful Remedies for Victims of Extraordinary Rendition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237 (2012);
Ashley Scott, Note & Comment, The State Secrets Privilege: Alternative Remedies in Cases of Torture
Abroad, 45 SW. L. REV. 219 (2015).
7.
The impunity that pervades the War on Terror is well-documented. See, e.g., HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NO MORE EXCUSES: A ROADMAP TO JUSTICE FOR CIA TORTURE (2015), https://
www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/01/no-more-excuses/roadmap-justice-cia-torture; INT’L
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., DENIAL OF JUSTICE: THE UNITED STATES’ FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE SENIOR OFFICIALS FOR TORTURE (2015), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/IACHR_HR-Situation-of-People-Affected-by-RDI_Advocates-for-US-Tor
ture-Prosecutions-102315.pdf; WORLD ORG. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS USA ET AL., INDEFENSIBLE: A
REFERENCE FOR PROSECUTING TORTURE AND OTHER FELONIES COMMITTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS
FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11TH (2012), http://www.humaneprosecutions.org/indefensible_a_
reference_for_prosecuting_torture.pdf.
8.
Reparations and apologies are an important, although under-utilized, response to
human rights abuses. See generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND
NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000); Pablo de Greiff, Repairing the Past: Compensation
for Victims of Human Rights Abuses, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 1, 1–21 (Pablo de Greiff
ed., 2006); Priscilla Haynes, Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16
HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994); Patricia Lundy & Bill Rolston, Redress for Past Harms? Official Apologies in Northern Ireland, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 104 (2016); Natsu Taylor Saito, At the Heart of the
Law: Remedies for Massive Wrongs, 27 REV. LITIG. 281 (2008); Lesley Wexler & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Designing Amends for Lawful Civilian Casualties, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 121 (2017).
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who were subject to discrimination and detention during the Second World War.9 Based on this historical analog, Part IV then
presents a legislative proposal to address the systematic abuses that
have occurred during the War on Terror.10 It proposes the adoption of the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029, which
would: (1) establish a commission of inquiry to investigate and document these and other cases of arbitrary detention and
mistreatment; (2) offer an apology and provide restitution to individuals who were wrongfully detained and mistreated by the United
States or by other countries with U.S. complicity during the War on
Terror; and (3) establish a public education program that would
publicize the commission’s findings and promote awareness of
human rights in the United States and abroad.
While some political leaders have called for religious profiling to
combat terrorism—justifying such calls by relying on the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War and the
much-maligned Supreme Court decision of Korematsu v. United
States as precedent—this Article takes a different lesson from history.11 In this regard, it is a particularly timely moment to revisit the
legacy of Japanese internment and the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.
Through the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029, the
9.
Several commentators have analogized the treatment of detainees during the War
on Terror with the treatment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. See, e.g.,
Victor Bascara, Cultural Politics of Redress: Reassessing the Meaning of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988
After 9/11, 10 ASIAN L.J. 185, 186 (2003); Cameron Bell, Repatriate . . . Then Compensate: Why
the United States Owes Reparation Payments to Former Guantanamo Detainees, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
867, 925 (2015); Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307, 309–13 (2006); David A. Harris, On the
Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women,” 76 MO. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2011); Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s
Shadow, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 265 (2005); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege:
Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN. L.J. 1, 11
(2001); Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A “Constant Caution” in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37, 38 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial
Justice on Trial—Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2003); Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September
11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 451 (2002).
10. This Article does not address the potential claims of individuals who engaged in
hostilities or acts of terrorism.
11. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Korematsu Supreme Court Ruling Upholding Internment Is
Still a “Loaded Weapon” for Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chin-korematsu-20161222-story.html; Margaret Hartmann, Trump Supporter Cites Japanese Internment Camps as “Precedent” for Muslim Registry, N.Y.
MAG (Nov. 17, 2016, 1:53 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/trump-supporter-muslim-registry-internment-camps.html. But see Noah Feldman, Why Korematsu is Not
a Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/
why-korematsu-is-not-a-precedent.html?_r=0; Lily Rothman, Why Citing the Japanese Internment
as a “Precedent” for a Muslim Registry is So Alarming, TIME (Nov. 17, 2016), http://time.com/
4574680/muslim-registry-japanese-internment/.
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United States would provide a historical record of the human rights
abuses it committed during the War on Terror and would accept
responsibility for the harms it caused. Such actions would make
clear that even advanced democracies must consider transitional
justice mechanisms when they emerge from periods of armed conflict or times of crisis.12
The proposed legislation is captioned the “Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029” because the current political
environment in the United States makes its adoption unlikely in the
immediate future.13 U.S. actions during the War on Terror remain
contentious, and many politicians and commentators argue that
the United States should not apologize for actions taken to prevent
terrorist attacks.14 Indeed, President Trump has even argued in support of torture and other extreme measures against detainees.15
Historically, U.S. apologies and redress for past injustices have occurred only after significant time has passed.16 The year 2029 is also
an appropriate date because it coincides with the potential release
12.

See generally LISA MAGARELL & LORNA PETERSON, INT’L CENT. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSAFTER TORTURE: U.S. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RIGHT TO REDRESS (2010), https://
www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-USA-Right-Redress-2010-English.pdf; George D.
Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and
Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 FLA. L. REV. 193 (2011); Jonathan Hafetz, Resisting Accountability:
Transitional Justice in the Post-9/11 United States, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 429 (2015); Jorge Heine,
Politics as Usual? U.S. Torture Practices 2001-2008 and Transitional Justice, 13 INT’L STUD. REV.
570 (2011); Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681 (2014);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Internments Then and Now: Constitutional Accountability in Post-9/11 America,
2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 71 (2010); Nadia Shamsi, From Villa Grimaldi to Guantanamo
Bay: Remedying Human Rights Abuses in Chile and the United States, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 355 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, How to End the Stigma of Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/how-to-end-the-stigma-ofguantanamo.html (“Some advocates for detainees dream of apologies and reparations, but
that seems politically unrealistic; the Supreme Court upheld indefinite detention as lawful,
the war against Al Qaeda and its progeny continues, and many Republican lawyers have come
to oppose releasing any more low-level detainees in the Obama era.”).
14. See generally MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT (2004); JAMES E. MITCHELL, ENHANCED INTERROGATION (2016); REBUTTAL: THE CIA RESPONDS TO THE SENATE
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE’S STUDY OF ITS DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (Bill
Harlow ed., 2015); MARC A. THIESSEN, COURTING DISASTER (2010).
15. See, e.g., James Risen & Sheri Fink, Trump Said ‘Torture Works.’ An Echo Is Feared Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/us/politics/trumptorture-guantanamo.html; Matt Apuzzo & James Risen, Plan to Revive Waterboarding Faces Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2016, at A1; Nick Visser, Trump Amps Up His for Torture: “We’re
Going to Have to Do Things That Are Unthinkable,” HUFFINGTON POST, (July 1, 2016), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-torture-waterboarding_us_5775d740e4b04164640f
6597.
16. Of course, not all reparations movements have succeeded. See, e.g., ALFRED L.
BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON (2006); J. ANGELO CORLETT, RACE, RACISM AND REPARATIONS (2003); REDRESS FOR HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE UNITED STATES (Michael T. Martin
& Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007).
TICE,
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date of the infamous report on the CIA’s torture and rendition program prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI).17 The year 2029 thus serves as both aspiration and deadline.
The search for justice often begins with small, incremental steps,
and this Article offers a detailed legislative proposal that could
mark the beginning of a long journey away from this dark period in
our nation’s history.
I. THREE VICTIMS

OF

WRONGFUL DETENTION

AND

MISTREATMENT

In its worldwide efforts to identify and detain suspected terrorists, the United States cast a wide net. On some occasions, these
efforts were successful and Al Qaeda operatives were captured.18
But on other occasions, these efforts failed, and innocents were abducted, detained, and abused.19
A. Khaled El-Masri
In 2003, Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent,
lived in Ulm, Germany with his wife and five young children.20 On
December 31, 2003, El-Masri traveled from his home to Skopje,
Macedonia for a short vacation.21 When El-Masri crossed the border
17. Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, Counsel to the President to the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4/4/
446cfcf7-17ac-4196-a199-3fdc6a28e9b5/E7CD816F81A1BC3DD6BD9018FA3E79B8.wh-letteron-torture-report.pdf; see also Spencer Ackerman, Senate Torture Report to Be Kept from Public for
12 Years After Obama Decision, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2016, 5:34 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/obama-senate-cia-torture-report-september11-classified (noting that the report will not be declassified for “at least 12 years” after December 2016).
18. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGEN, MANHUNT: THE TEN-YEAR SEARCH FOR BIN LADEN FROM 9/
11 TO ABBOTTABAD 95–99 (2012) (describing the detention of Mohammed Al-Qahtani and
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR
ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 190–93 (2008) (describing the detention of Mohammed Al-Qahtani and other Al Qaeda operatives).
19. Portions of Part II(A) and (B) of this Article were previously published in Aceves,
supra note 6.
20. See Marcus Brandt, Merkel Says that U.S. Admits Error in Detaining German National,
USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2005, 12:28 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/200512-06-ricemerkel_x.htm; Scott Horton, The El-Masri Cable, HARPER’S BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010,
5:23 PM), https://harpers.org/blog/2010/11/the-el-masri-cable/; Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2005), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476.html.
21. Petition with a Request for an Investigation and Hearing on the Merits at 5, El-Masri
v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 21/16, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.157, doc. 25
(2016), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/elmasri_iachr_20080409.pdf [hereinafter
IACHR Petition].
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into Macedonia, he was detained by Macedonian law enforcement
officials.22 His passport was confiscated, and he was eventually detained without charge in Macedonia for three weeks. Throughout
his detention in Macedonia, El-Masri was kept isolated at a hotel.23
He was questioned about his religious beliefs and his association
with several individuals and Islamic organizations.24 He was not allowed to communicate with his family, and his requests to speak
with a lawyer and German consular officials were denied.25 After
two weeks, El-Masri began a hunger strike to protest his detention
and treatment.26 On approximately January 23, 2004, El-Masri was
taken to a local airport.
Upon arrival, still handcuffed and blindfolded, he was initially
placed in a chair, where he sat for one and a half hours. He
was told that he would be taken into a room for a medical
examination before being transferred to Germany. Then, two
people violently pulled his arms back. On that occasion he was
beaten severely from all sides. His clothes were sliced from his
body with scissors or a knife. His underwear was forcibly removed. He was thrown to the floor, his hands were pulled back
and a boot was placed on his back. He then felt a firm object
being forced into his anus. . . . He was then pulled from the
floor and dragged to a corner of the room, where his feet were
tied together. His blindfold was removed. A flash went off and
temporarily blinded him. When he recovered his sight, he saw
seven or eight men dressed in black and wearing black ski
masks. One of the men placed him in an adult nappy. He was
then dressed in a dark blue short-sleeved tracksuit. A bag was
placed over his head and a belt was put on him with chains
attached to his wrists and ankles. The men put earmuffs and
eye pads on him and blindfolded and hooded him. They bent
him over, forcing his head down, and quickly marched him to
a waiting aircraft, with the shackles cutting into his ankles. The
aircraft was surrounded by armed Macedonian security guards.
He had difficulty breathing because of the bag that covered his
head. Once inside the aircraft, he was thrown to the floor face
down and his legs and arms were spread-eagled and secured to
the sides of the aircraft. During the flight he received two injections. An anesthetic [sic] was also administered over his
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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nose. He was mostly unconscious during the flight. A Macedonian exit stamp dated 23 January 2004 was affixed to the
applicant’s passport.27
When he arrived in Afghanistan, El-Masri was transferred to a
CIA facility near Kabul, known as the Salt Pit, where he was detained in a cell for the next four months.28 El-Masri was again
interrogated repeatedly about his association with alleged terrorists,
which he continued to deny.29 Despite numerous requests, he was
prevented from contacting a lawyer or any member of his family. ElMasri commenced another hunger strike to protest his detention.30
By February 2004, the CIA had examined El-Masri’s passport and
conducted further research on his background.31 It soon concluded
that El-Masri was not a member of Al Qaeda or any other terrorist
group: he was innocent. CIA Director George Tenet and Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice were notified that the CIA was detaining
an innocent German citizen, and yet El-Masri remained in detention for two more months.32
On May 28, 2004, El-Masri was taken from the Salt Pit and flown
to Albania, where he was placed in a waiting vehicle.33 After a long
car ride, he was released by his captors with no explanation and
told to walk away.34 El-Masri was soon detained by Albanian authorities, who questioned him about his presence in the country.35 He
was eventually sent back to Germany.36 When he arrived home, ElMasri discovered that his family had returned to Lebanon.37
On December 6, 2005, El-Masri filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking relief for
his abduction and detention.38 The lawsuit was filed against former
CIA Director George Tenet, ten unnamed employees of the CIA,
27. El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 274–75.
28. IACHR Petition, supra note 21, at 8.
29. Id. at 9–11.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Lisa Myers et al., CIA Accused of Detaining an Innocent Man, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 21, 2005, 7:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7591918/;#.V6_f5ZMrIfM.
33. IACHR Petition, supra note 21, at 14.
34. S. REP. NO. 113-288, at 129 (2014). According to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, El-Masri was given =C 14,500 when he was released. Id.
35. IACHR Petition, supra note 21, at 15.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Complaint, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05-CV01417). El-Masri was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union. Press Release,
ACLU, ACLU Files Landmark Lawsuit Challenging CIA’s “Extraordinary Rendition” of Innocent Man (Dec. 6, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-files-landmark-lawsuitchallenging-cias-extraordinary-rendition-innocent-man?redirect=cpredirect/22207.
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three corporate defendants, and ten unnamed employees of the defendant corporations.39 According to the complaint,
Mr. El-Masri’s abduction, detention, and interrogation without
legal process were carried out pursuant to an unlawful policy
and practice devised and implemented by defendant Tenet
known as “extraordinary rendition”: the clandestine abduction
and detention outside the United States of persons suspected
of involvement in terrorist activities, and their subsequent interrogation using methods impermissible under U.S. and
international laws.40
The complaint raised three causes of action: (1) violation of the
Fifth Amendment right to due process; (2) violation of the international norm against prolonged arbitrary detention; and (3)
violation of the international norm against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.41 El-Masri sought compensatory and
punitive damages.42
Soon after the case was filed, the United States submitted a Motion to Intervene and Statement of Interest with the district court.43
While the United States was not sued by El-Masri, it was entitled to
enter the proceedings to protect U.S. interests.44 In its submission,
the United States invoked the state secrets privilege by claiming further court proceedings could risk disclosure of classified
information and that such disclosure would harm national security.45 Accordingly, the United States sought dismissal of the case.
39. Complaint, supra note 38. The corporate defendants were alleged to have provided
the aircraft used for El-Masri’s rendition. See id.
40. Id. at 1–2. The complaint offered a detailed description of the extraordinary rendition program and its functions.
[I]t permits agents of the United States to detain foreign nationals that it considers
terrorist suspects outside U.S. sovereign territory and without legal process; and it
permits those agents, primarily through counterparts in foreign intelligence agencies,
to employ interrogation methods on suspects that would not be permissible under
federal or international law as a means of obtaining information from suspects.
Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 18–25.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Motion to Intervene, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No.
1:05-CV-01417) (filed on Mar. 13, 2006).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012) (granting the Department of Justice the power to “attend
to any [ ] interest of the United States”).
45. United States’ Statement of Interest, Assertion of a Formal Claim of State Secrets
Privilege, and Request for Expedited Consideration at 1, Attach. A, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05-CV-01417). Two declarations were submitted: one
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On May 12, 2006, the district court accepted the U.S. assertion of
the state secrets privilege and dismissed the case.46 The court found
that litigating El-Masri’s claims would potentially expose classified
information.47 Under these circumstances, the court concluded
that dismissal was necessary.48 Despite its holding, the district court
expressed significant concerns about the outcome and suggested
that El-Masri was entitled to some type of remedy.
Finally, it is worth noting that putting aside all the legal issues,
if El-Masri’s allegations are true or essentially true, then all
fair-minded people, including those who believe that state
secrets must be protected, that this lawsuit cannot proceed,
and that renditions are a necessary step to take in this war,
must also agree that El-Masri has suffered injuries as a result of
our country’s mistake and deserves a remedy. Yet, it is also
clear from the result reached here that the only sources of that
remedy must be the Executive Branch or the Legislative
Branch, not the Judicial Branch.49
On March 2, 2007, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s
dismissal, reaffirming the applicability of the state secrets privilege.50 While the court was mindful of the consequences to El-Masri
in dismissing the lawsuit, it nevertheless felt obligated to do so.51
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to accept El-Masri’s petition for
writ of certiorari, thereby ending the case.
While El-Masri’s efforts to seek redress in the United States were
unsuccessful, his case received significant international attention.
In Europe, El-Masri’s case was the subject of inquiries by the European Parliament as well as the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe.52 These inquiries documented several cases of
extraordinary rendition and implicated several European countries

declaration was classified and only available to the judge, and the other declaration was for
public release. Id. at 2.
46. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
47. Id. at 539.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 541.
50. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007).
51. Id. at 312.
52. See EUR. PARL. DOC. A6-0020/2007 (2007); Eur. Parl. Ass., Comm. on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, Doc. No. AS/Jur
(2006) 03 rev (2006), http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2006/20060124_jdoc032006_
e.pdf.

174

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 51:1

as complicit in the rendition program. In response, several countries initiated criminal investigations.53 However, no individual was
ever held accountable for El-Masri’s rendition.
On April 8, 2008, El-Masri filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the United States.54 The
complaint alleged that the United States had violated the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man by subjecting El-Masri
to extraordinary rendition and by failing to provide him with a judicial remedy.55 The United States took eight years to respond to ElMasri’s petition.56 In its submission to the Inter-American Commission, the United States argued that the American Declaration did
not create binding obligations on it even though the United States
takes its commitments under the American Declaration “very seriously.”57 On April 15, 2016, the Inter-American Commission
declared El-Masri’s petition admissible and announced that it
would consider the merits of his claims.58
El-Masri also pursued a separate case in the European Court of
Human Rights against Macedonia for its complicity in his rendition.
On July 20, 2009, El-Masri filed a complaint before the European
Court of Human Rights against Macedonia alleging several violations of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.59 The complaint alleged that
Macedonia “had arrested him, held him incommunicado, questioned and ill-treated him, and handed him over” to the CIA, who
then subjected him to further abuse for several months.60 On December 13, 2012, the European Court issued its decision in the
case.61 The Court found Macedonia responsible for multiple violations of the European Convention, including the prohibitions
against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and arbitrary
detention.62 The Court awarded El-Masri =C 60,000 in damages.63
53. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, INVESTIGATIONS INTO CIA TORTURE AND RENDITION
2–4 (Nov. 2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-ciainvestigations-roundup_0.pdf (Germany and Spain specifically investigated matters related to
El-Masri).
54. IAHCR Petition, supra note 21.
55. Id. at 4.
56. El-Masri v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 21/16, OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.157, doc. 25 (2016).
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 7.
59. El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 271.
60. Id. at 271.
61. Id. at 263.
62. Id. at 341, 348–49, 352.
63. Id. at 354.
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B. Maher Arar
In 2002, Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian citizen, was working as a telecommunications engineer in Ottawa, where he lived
with his family.64 On September 26, 2002, Arar was traveling from
Tunisia back to Canada after a family vacation.65 His return flight
went through Zurich and New York City before it was scheduled to
arrive in Montreal. While transiting through John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, U.S. immigration officials
stopped Arar for questioning.66 Arar was identified by the National
Automated Immigration Lookout System as a member of a known
terrorist organization.67 He was subsequently questioned by immigration officials about possible connections to Al Qaeda. Arar was
then transferred from the airport to the Metropolitan Detention
Center in Brooklyn and held for several days.68 During his detention, he was visited briefly by a Canadian consular official and an
attorney.69 Eventually, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) incorrectly determined that Arar was a member of Al
Qaeda and that he posed a threat to the United States.70 In consultation with the State Department, INS concluded that Arar was
inadmissible and should be sent to Syria.71 In making this determination, INS and State Department officials considered Syria’s
assurances that Arar would not be subjected to torture if sent
there.72 A subsequent investigation by the Office of the Inspector
64.

CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE STORY OF MAHER ARAR: RENDITION TO TOR2 (2008), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/rendition%20to%20torture
%20report.pdf.
65. 1 COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND 149
(2006), http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv1-eng.pdf [hereinafter 1 COMM’N OF
INQUIRY].
66. Id.
67. Id. at 204; Scott Shane, The Costs of Outsourcing Interrogation: A Canadian Muslim’s
Long Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/
world/americas/the-costs-of-outsourcing-interrogation-a-canadian-muslims.html.
68. 1 COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 65, at 182.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id.; see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 586 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he INS Regional
Director, J. Scott Blackman, determined from classified and unclassified information that
Arar is ‘clearly and unequivocally’ a member of al-Qaeda and, therefore, ‘clearly and unequivocally inadmissible to the United States’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V).”).
72. See Jeff Sallot, U.S. Trusted Syria’s Assurances on Arar: Ashcroft, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 21,
2003), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/us-trusted-syrias-assurances-onarar-ashcroft/article1168875/?ref HT tp://www.theglobeandmail.com&; see also 1 COMM’N OF
INQUIRY, supra note 65, at 204. Article 3 of the Convention against Torture provides that
States Parties may not “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
TURE
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General in the Department of Homeland Security concluded that
the process used to remove Arar and send him to Syria was questionable and did not follow standard procedures.73 In addition, the
Inspector General determined that Syria’s assurances that Arar
would not be tortured were ambiguous.74 Given Syria’s abysmal
human rights record, the decision to send Arar to Syria was troubling. Because the United States could have sent Arar back to
Canada, its decision to send him to Syria was even more
problematic.75
On October 8, 2002, Arar was transported to Washington D.C. by
private plane and then flown to Jordan.76 Neither the Canadian
consulate nor Arar’s attorney were informed that he had been removed.77 From Jordan, Arar was transferred to Syria, where the
Syrian government immediately detained him.78 For several days,
Syrian officials interrogated and tortured Arar. They accused him
of being a terrorist and demanded his confession.79 The torture began soon after Arar arrived in Syria.
The beating started that day and was very intense for a week,
and then less intense for another week. That second and the
third days were the worst. I could hear other prisoners being
tortured, and screaming and screaming. Interrogations are
carried out in different rooms.
torture.” Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The United States implemented this
obligation through various laws and administrative actions. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 382 (1994). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c), the
Secretary of State may seek assurances from a specific country that an alien will not be tortured if the alien is removed to that country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(1) (2016). “Once
assurances are provided under . . . this section, the alien’s claim for protection under the
Convention Against Torture shall not be considered further by an immigration judge, the
Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(3) (2016).
73. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE REMOVAL OF A CANACITIZEN TO SYRIA, OIG-08-18 30 (2008), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/PDFs/The%20
Removal%20of%20a%20Canadian%20Citizen%20to%20Syria%20%28Redacted%29.pdf
[hereinafter, OIG REPORT]; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
THE REMOVAL OF A CANADIAN CITIZEN TO SYRIA, ADDENDUM TO OIG-08-18 (2010), https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGa_08-18_Mar10.pdf.
DIAN

74.

OIG REPORT, supra note 73, at 5.

75.

Id. at 21–22.

76.

1 COMM’N

77.

Id.

78.

OIG REPORT, supra note 73, at 7.

OF

INQUIRY, supra note 65, at 174.

79. Canadian Citizen Maher Arar, Deported by U.S., Details Torture in Syria, DEMOCRACY NOW!
(Nov. 7, 2003), http://www.democracynow.org/2003/11/7/canadian_man_deported_by
_u_s.
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One tactic they use is to question prisoners for two hours, and
then put them in a waiting room, so they can hear the others
screaming, and then bring them back to continue the
interrogation.
The cable is a black electrical cable, about two inches thick.
They hit me with it everywhere on my body. They mostly
aimed for my palms, but sometimes missed and hit my wrists
they were sore and red for three weeks. They also struck me on
my hips, and lower back. Interrogators constantly threatened
me with the metal chair, tire and electric shocks.
The tire is used to restrain prisoners while they torture them
with beating on the sole of their feet. I guess I was lucky, because they put me in the tire, but only as a threat. I was not
beaten while in tire.
They used the cable on the second and third day, and after
that mostly beat me with their hands, hitting me in the stomach and on the back of my neck, and slapping me on the face.
Where they hit me with the cables, my skin turned blue for two
or three weeks, but there was no bleeding. At the end of the
day they told me tomorrow would be worse. So I could not
sleep.
Then on the third day, the interrogation lasted about eighteen
hours.80
When he was not being interrogated, Arar was placed in a damp,
underground cell.
[H]e was kept in an underground cell in darkness, except for
the light that would come in through a small opening on the
top of the cell. Cats would sometimes walk over the small
opening and relieve themselves on him. The only time he saw
daylight was when he was brought to see Mr. [Léo] Martel for
a consular visit. His cell measured 3’ x 6’ x 7’ and he slept on a
thin mattress on the floor. He was given two bottles: one to
drink from and one to relieve himself in. The toilets were
outside the cell and he could use them only three times a day.
80. 2 COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND
792–93 (2006), http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv2-eng.pdf [hereinafter 2
COMM’N OF INQUIRY].
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He was allowed to do his laundry only once a week, in the
toilet area in darkness.81
On October 21, 2002, the Canadian Embassy discovered that
Arar had been transferred to Syria.82 Embassy personnel immediately contacted Syrian authorities, who confirmed Arar was in
custody. In fact, Arar remained in Syrian custody for an additional
year. On October 5, 2003, Syrian authorities released Arar to the
Canadian Embassy, stating they had found no connection between
Arar and any criminal or terrorist organization.83 He immediately
left the country accompanied by Canadian diplomatic officials.84
Arar was never charged with any crime by the United States or
Canada.85
On January 22, 2004, Arar filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking compensatory damages and declaratory relief against Attorney General
John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and several other federal officials.86 The complaint alleged four causes of action: (1)
violation of the Fifth Amendment arising out of Arar’s detention in
the United States (before his removal to Syria); (2) violation of the
Fifth Amendment arising out of Arar’s detention in Syria and his
denial of access to counsel, the courts, and the Canadian consulate;
(3) violation of the Fifth Amendment arising out of Arar’s torture
in Syria; and (4) violation of the prohibition against torture for conspiring with Jordanian and Syrian officials to bring about his
torture.87 According to the complaint, “federal officials removed
Mr. Arar to Syria under the Government’s ‘extraordinary renditions’ program precisely because Syria could use methods of
interrogation to obtain information from Mr. Arar that would not
81. Id. at 471; see also 1 COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 65, at 229 (identifying Mr. Léo
Martel as the counsel at the Canadian Embassy in Syria).
82. 1 COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 65, at 229.
83. See 2 COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 80, at 467–70 (“General Khalil informed his
guests that Mr. Arar had been acquitted by the judge and was free to go.”).
84. Id. at 470.
85. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 4 (“Maher has never been
charged with any crime in any country.”). According to the Canadian government’s official
inquiry, Syrian officials indicated that Arar had been acquitted by a judge although no evidence was presented to confirm that any proceedings occurred. 2 COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra
note 80, at 468.
86. Complaint, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 1:04-CV00249), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559
(2d Cir. 2009), 2004 WL 2410405. Arar was represented by the Center for Constitutional
Rights. Arar v. Ashcroft et al, CTR. CONST. RTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/ourcases/arar-v-ashcroft-et-al (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
87. Complaint, supra note 86, at 20–24.
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be legally or morally acceptable in this country or in other democracies.”88 The complaint sought compensatory and punitive
damages as well as a judgment “[d]eclaring that the actions of Defendants, their agents, and their employees, are illegal and violate
Mr. Arar’s constitutional, civil, and international human rights.”89
The United States moved to dismiss the case on several grounds,
including the state secrets privilege.90
On February 16, 2006, the district court dismissed the lawsuit although it declined to rule on the assertion of the state secrets
privilege.91 With respect to Arar’s constitutional claims regarding
extraordinary rendition, the court examined their applicability
under the Bivens doctrine,92 which offers civil redress for constitutional violations.93 In this case, the district court determined that
special factors counseled hesitation in extending a constitutional
claim under Bivens for extraordinary rendition.
[T]he task of balancing individual rights against national-security concerns is one that courts should not undertake
without the guidance or the authority of the coordinate
branches, in whom the Constitution imposes responsibility for
our foreign affairs and national security. Those branches have
the responsibility to determine whether judicial oversight is
appropriate. Without explicit legislation, judges should be
hesitant to fill an arena that, until now, has been left untouched—perhaps deliberately—by the Legislative and
Executive branches. To do otherwise would threaten “our customary policy of deference to the President in matters of
foreign affairs.”94
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Arar’s constitutional law
claims and the remaining counts.

88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 24.
90. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d
Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
91. Id. at 287–88. Since the district court determined that there was no constitutional
right to seek damages under Bivens, it concluded that “the issue involving state secrets is
moot.” Id. at 287.
92. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
93. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
94. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
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On June 30, 2008, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.95 An en banc panel of the Second Circuit
upheld the decision on November 2, 2009.96 The en banc court
identified several distinct factors that compelled dismissal.97 Specifically, the court indicated that adjudication would result in excessive
judicial entanglement in government affairs and would result in the
potential release of confidential information.98 Even admitting redacted documents would impose undue restrictions on judicial
proceedings.99 In closing remarks, the court suggested that Congress was better situated to provide a remedy. “We recognize our
limited competence, authority, and jurisdiction to make rules or set
parameters to govern the practice called rendition. By the same token, we can easily locate that competence, expertise, and
responsibility elsewhere: in Congress.”100 The U.S. Supreme Court
declined Arar’s petition for certiorari.101
While Arar was unsuccessful in U.S. courts, he received a more
receptive response in Canada. Following Arar’s release and return
to Canada, the Canadian government initiated a public inquiry to
examine the circumstances surrounding Arar’s rendition and to
consider Canada’s culpability.102 The Commission of Inquiry conducted an extensive investigation into Arar’s rendition and
reviewed the Canadian government’s role.103 It found that the Canadian government provided the United States with inaccurate
information regarding Arar and his alleged terrorist connections,
which the United States then used as the basis for detaining him
and subsequently sending him to Syria.104 In addition, the Canadian
government failed to take appropriate steps to protect Arar once he
95. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc,
585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010).
96. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978
(2010); see also Second Circuit Holds That Alleged Victim of Extraordinary Rendition Did Not State a
Bivens Claim, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2010).
97. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 571–82.
98. Id. at 574–76.
99. Id. at 576–77.
100. Id. at 580–81.
101. Arar v. Ashcroft, 560 U.S. 978 (2010).
102. See, e.g., COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION
TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9–10 (2006) [hereinafter COMM’N OF INQUIRY, ANALYSIS], http://publications.gc.ca/
collections/Collection/CP32-88-1-2006E-AR.pdf. See generally Kent Roach, Review and Oversight of National Security Activities and Some Reflections on Canada’s Arar Inquiry, 29 CARDOZO. L.
REV. 53 (2007); Erin Craddock, Note, Torturous Consequences and the Case of Maher Arar: Can
Canadian Solutions “Cure” the Due Process Deficiencies in U.S. Removal Proceedings, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 621 (2008).
103. See COMM’N OF INQUIRY, ANALYSIS, supra note 102.
104. Id. at 13–14.
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was in Syrian custody.105 On January 26, 2007, the Canadian government formally apologized to Arar for its role in his detention and
provided him $10 million in compensation. Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued an apology on behalf of the Canadian
government.
On behalf of the Government of Canada, I wish to apologize
to you, Monia Mazigh [Arar’s wife] and your family for any
role Canadian officials may have played in the terrible ordeal
that all of you experienced in 2002 and 2003.
Although these events occurred under the last government,
please rest assured that this government will do everything in
its power to ensure that the issues raised by Commissioner
O’Connor are addressed.
I trust that, having arrived at a negotiated settlement, we have
ensured that fair compensation will be paid to you and your
family. I sincerely hope that these words and actions will assist
you and your family in your efforts to begin a new and hopeful
chapter in your lives.106
C. Amir Meshal
Amir Meshal is a U.S. citizen who traveled to Somalia in November 2006 to gain a greater understanding of Islam.107 At the time,
south Somalia was relatively peaceful after years of conflict.108 Soon
after he arrived, however, a violent conflict developed in Somalia,
and Meshal was forced to flee to neighboring Kenya.109 For three
weeks, Meshal sought refuge and a way to get home.110 On approximately January 24, 2007, a Kenyan military patrol detained
Meshal.111 Although Meshal was initially held by Kenyan authorities,
105. See id. at 14–15 (noting a “serious concern” for actions taken by Canadian officials
while Arar was in Syrian captivity).
106. Press Release, Gov’t of Can., Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to Maher
Arar and His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26, 2007),
https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2007/01/prime-minister-releases-letter-apologymaher-arar-his-family-announces-completion-mediation-process.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true; see also Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Nisha Nath, From Deportation to Apology:
The Case of Maher Arar and the Canadian State, 39 CAN. ETHNIC STUD. 71 (2008).
107. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 23, Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 47 F. Supp. 3d 115
(D.D.C. 2014) (No. 09-CV-2178-EGS ), aff’d, 804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015), https://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0005-0003.pdf.
108. Id. ¶ 21.
109. Id. ¶¶ 2, 35.
110. Id. ¶ 46.
111. Id.
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he was interrogated on several occasions by U.S. government
agents, including two FBI agents.
During these interrogation sessions, U.S. agents threatened
Meshal with torture and death. On one occasion, a U.S. government agent grabbed Meshal and forced him to the window and
stated, “Allah is up in the clouds,” and “the U.S. is almost as powerful as Allah.”112 He also told Meshal that the agents knew he was
hiding something, but they “had ways of getting the information
they want.”113 The agent threatened to send Meshal to Israel, where
he said the Israelis would “make him disappear.”114 On another occasion, a U.S. government agent told Meshal “that he had spoken
with the Egyptians and that they were very interested in speaking
with” him.115 He added “that the Egyptians ‘had ways of making
[him] talk.’ ”116 The agent alluded to the film Midnight Express and
warned Meshal that he could also be tortured if he did not cooperate and disclose his ties to Al Qaeda.117 He also told Meshal that
“[y]ou[’ve] made it so that even your grandkids are going to be
affected by what you did.”118
As part of their investigation, FBI agents contacted Meshal’s parents in the United States and notified them that Meshal was
detained in Kenya.119 Eventually, U.S. consular officials in Kenya
discovered Meshal’s detention. At the same time, the Muslim
Human Rights Forum, a Kenyan human rights organization, also
became aware of Meshal’s detention and began legal proceedings
seeking his release.120 In response, Kenyan officials, working with
U.S. government agents, transferred Meshal to Somalia and then
Ethiopia where U.S. government agents repeatedly interviewed him
again.121
Throughout his detention in Ethiopia, U.S. government officials
and Ethiopian authorities denied Meshal access to counsel. When
Meshal’s family discovered he was being held in Ethiopia, they contacted the State Department to seek assistance.122 Congressman
112. Id. ¶ 86.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. ¶ 88.
116. Id.
117. Id. In the movie Midnight Express, a U.S. citizen is detained in Turkey and subjected
to repeated torture and abusive treatment while in prison. MIDNIGHT EXPRESS (Columbia
Pictures 1978).
118. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 88.
119. Id. ¶ 102.
120. See id. ¶¶ 92–101.
121. See id. ¶¶ 108–19.
122. First Amended Complaint at 49, Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 47 F. Supp. 3d 115
(D.D.C. 2014) (No. 09-CV-2178-EGS), aff’d, 804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015), ECF No. 31.

FALL 2017]

The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act

183

Rush Holt, who served as Meshal’s congressional representative,
also inquired about Meshal’s status with the FBI and State Department.123 Soon thereafter, Meshal was released by Ethiopian
officials.124 On May 26, 2007, Meshal returned to the United
States.125 He was never charged with any crime by the United States.
Upon his return to the United States, Meshal filed a lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against two FBI
agents and several other federal officials who participated in his detention.126 The complaint raised several constitutional claims,
including violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.127
Mr. Meshal brings this action against the Defendants for their
role in the violation of his rights under the Constitution of the
United States. The Constitution does not permit U.S. officials
to threaten American citizens with forced disappearance, torture, and other serious harm, or otherwise to interrogate them
coercively. Nor does the Constitution permit U.S. officials to
evade the elementary commands of due process simply by directing, conspiring, and/or actively and substantially
participating with foreign officials to detain, interrogate, or
render U.S. citizens in a manner that would be patently unlawful if carried out by those U.S. officials themselves.128
The complaint also alleged violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).129 On June 13, 2014, the district court dismissed
the lawsuit.130 While the court was outraged “by Mr. Meshal’s ‘appalling (and, candidly, embarrassing) allegations’ of mistreatment by
the United States of America,” it held that a constitutional cause of
action was unavailable under the Bivens doctrine.131 Citing circuit
precedent, the court also dismissed the TVPA claim because it did
not apply to U.S. government officials or private U.S. persons.132
123. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 158.
124. Id. ¶ 166.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1. Meshal was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union. Id.
127. Id. ¶ 3.
128. Id. ¶ 7.
129. Id. ¶¶ 3, 204–13; see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
130. Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 47 F. Supp. 3d 115 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 804 F.3d 417
(D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
131. Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 123 n.5.
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On October 23, 2015, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal in a
2–1 ruling.133 The Court of Appeals shared the district court’s concerns regarding the troubling nature of Meshal’s allegations of
mistreatment by U.S. government officials.134 Notwithstanding, the
Court found that Meshal’s constitutional claims under Bivens were
unavailable in light of the unique circumstances of the case.135 Because Meshal’s case implicated a terrorism investigation and
involved the extraterritorial application of constitutional remedies,
the Court determined that dismissal was warranted.136 To achieve
redress in such cases, the Court indicated that victims must look to
another branch of government.137 According to the Court, “[i]f
people like Meshal are to have recourse to damages for alleged constitutional violations committed during a terrorism investigation
occurring abroad, either Congress or the Supreme Court must
specify the scope of the remedy.”138 Judge Brett Kavanaugh issued a
concurring opinion reiterating the need for the federal courts to
defer to Congress in resolving these claims.139 According to Judge
Kavanaugh, “[i]f I were a Member of Congress, I might vote to enact a new tort cause of action to cover a case like Meshal’s. But as
judges, we do not get to make that decision.”140 In dissent, Judge
Nina Pillard argued that Meshal should have the right to challenge
the government’s alleged misconduct;141 indeed, such actions serve
as a necessary check on unbridled government power:
Constitutional damages remedies hold out hope of redress to
survivors of what is sometimes truly horrific abuse at the hands
of government agents. Witness this case. Such claims are rarely
brought and, due to legal and factual complexities, they almost never succeed. Yet their existence has enormous
value. . . . United States law enforcement is more active internationally today than ever before, increasing the relevance of
Bivens’ remedial and deterrent functions in cases like this one.
Because I do not believe that precedent supports eliminating
133.
(2017).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2325
Id. at 418.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 426–27.
Id. at 429.
See id. at 429–31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id. at 431.
Id. at 446–47 (Pillard, J., dissenting).
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Meshal’s suit or that defendants made a showing that any congressional action or special factors should preclude it, I
respectfully dissent.142
D. Acknowledging There are More Victims
The stories of Khaled El-Masri, Maher Arar, and Amir Meshal
highlight the challenges faced by victims of arbitrary detention and
mistreatment during the War on Terror. Regrettably, their stories
are not unique and many more victims shared a similar fate.143 According to a former State Department official, many detainees at
Guantanamo were innocent.144
[I]t became apparent to me as early as August 2002, and probably earlier to other State Department personnel who were
focused on these issues, that many of the prisoners detained at
Guantánamo had been taken into custody without regard to
whether they were truly enemy combatants, or in fact whether
many of them were enemies at all. I soon realized from my
conversations with military colleagues as well as foreign service
officers in the field that many of the detainees were, in fact,
victims of incompetent battlefield vetting. There was no meaningful way to determine whether they were terrorists, Taliban,
or simply innocent civilians picked up on a very confused battlefield or in the territory of another state such as Pakistan.145
Similar acknowledgements appear in the 2014 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the CIA’s torture and rendition
program:
While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it
had wrongfully detained five individuals throughout the
course of the detention program, a review of CIA records indicates that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of
the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees identified in this Study,
142. Id. at 447 (Pillard, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTANAMO FILES (2007); Mark Denbeaux et al.,
Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1211 (2011).
144. Declaration of Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson (Ret.) at 5, Hamad v. Bush, No. CV
05-1009 JDB (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/files/wilkerson-sworndeclaration.pdf.
145. Id. at 4.
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did not meet the MON [Memorandum of Notification] standard for detention. This is a conservative calculation and
includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined
did not meet the standard for detention.146
Some of the detainees who were eventually released by the CIA
because they were innocent had been subjected to horrific treatment, including being “subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of
standing sleep deprivation.”147 As more information is released
about U.S. operations during the War on Terror, the number of
documented cases involving innocent detainees will only increase.148 The Bush and Obama administrations refused to accept
responsibility.149 The Trump administration has given no indication
it will do so. The federal courts have declined to provide redress.

146. S. REP. NO. 113–288, at 15-16 (2014) (citations omitted); see also MAYER, supra note
18, at 183–87 (describing internal reviews at the CIA and the lack of response). The Memorandum of Notification (MON) was issued by President George Bush on Sept. 17, 2001 and
authorized the CIA to capture and detain individuals posing a threat to the United States. S.
REP. NO. 113–288, Findings and Conclusions, at 9.
147. S. REP. NO. 113–288, at 16 n.32.
148. See, e.g., Alex Emmons, Former CIA Detainees Describe Previously Unknown Torture Tactic:
A Make-Shift Electric Chair, INTERCEPT (Oct. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/
2016/10/03/former-cia-detainees-describe-previously-unknown-torture-tactic-a-makeshiftelectric-chair/; Maggie Michael, In Yemen’s Secret Prisons, UAE Tortures and US Interrogates, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 22, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/4925f7f0fa654853bd6f2f57174179
fe; Greg Miller et al., Newly Released CIA Files Expose Grim Details of Agency Interrogation Program,
WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
newly-released-cia-files-expose-grim-details-of-agency-interrogation-program/2016/06/14/
6d04a01e-326a-11e6-95c0-2a6873031302_story.html?utm_term=.06db0ceef677; Charlie Savage, 15 Guantanamo Detainees Are Sent to Emirates in Largest Obama-Era Transfer, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/politics/guantanamo-detaineesemirates-transfer.html?_r=0.
149. See, e.g., LORAMY GERSTBAUER, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF Apology
104–07 (2016). In stark contrast, the Canadian government offered Maher Arar an apology
and reparations for its own actions and complicity. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
The European Court of Human Rights held Macedonia accountable for its role in the mistreatment of Khaled El-Masri and provided him compensation for his suffering. El-Masri v.
Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 263. The United Kingdom also
indicated a willingness to offer redress in cases of government mistreatment of detainees.
David Cameron, Prime Minister of U.K., Statement Given to the House of Commons on the
Treatment of Terror Suspects (July 6, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
statement-on-detainees (“[W]e are committed to mediation with those who have brought
civil claims about their detention in Guantanamo. And wherever appropriate, we will offer
compensation.”); see John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Britain to Compensate Guantanamo Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/world/europe/17britain.html. But see Cori Crider, Why Can’t Britain Apologise to These Victims of Rendition?,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2017, 5:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/
jan/19/britain-apologise-rendition-mi6-abdel-hakim-belhaj-gaddafi.
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Indeed, they have been unwilling to even consider the merits of the
underlying claims.150
And yet, while the federal courts have failed to offer redress in
these cases, they have often suggested that some type of remedy is
warranted. In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., for example, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that victims of extraordinary rendition
could not seek compensation for their injuries.151 While the court
denied relief, it suggested the plaintiffs might be entitled to nonjudicial remedies through executive branch action or remedial legislation. The court even referenced an important historical
precedent—the reparations offered to Japanese Americans for
their detention during the Second World War.

II. A HISTORICAL ANALOG: THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT

OF

1988

The treatment of Japanese Americans by the United States government during the Second World War is, and will always remain, a
national shame.152 It offers a sober reminder that in times of crisis,
even courts do not always serve the interests of justice.153

A. Discrimination and Detention
Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military began
developing plans to move and detain individuals of Japanese ancestry living in the western United States.154 While these plans were
150. See, e.g., Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649
F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1002 (2011).
151. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d at 1091–92.
152. See generally JEANNE WAKATSUKI HOUSTON & JAMES D. HOUSTON, FAREWELL TO
MANZANAR (1973); LAST WITNESSES (Erica Harth ed., 2001); JOHN TATEISHI, AND JUSTICE FOR
ALL (1984); MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY (1976).
153. See generally ROGER DANIELS, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES: THE RULE OF LAW IN
TIME OF WAR (2013); JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES
(Peter Irons ed.,1989); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 933 (2004); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489 (1945). Cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE (1998) (describing how presidents have suspended most civil liberties laws for the sake of national security during wartime
throughout the American history).
154. See generally ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND
WORLD WAR II (1972); ALLAN R. BOSWORTH, AMERICA’S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1967); RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT IN WORLD
WAR II (2015).
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ostensibly based on military necessity, they were, in fact, wholly unnecessary. No credible evidence existed that Japanese Americans
were disloyal or posed any national security threat. The removal
and internment plans were based on fear and motivated by racial
animus.155 On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the Secretary of War to
establish military areas in which designated persons could be removed and excluded.156 Congress ratified the Executive Order on
March 21, 1942 by authorizing criminal liability for individuals who
violated military orders regarding entry, presence, or departure
within designated military areas or zones or who committed any
prohibited acts in these locations.157 In response, military areas
were established in the western United States. The government imposed curfews to regulate and restrict movement of persons of
Japanese ancestry, including U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.158 Japanese Americans living in designated areas were
forced to sell their property, assemble at designated staging areas,
and relocate to internment camps.159 Ten camps were established,
mostly in the western United States.160 The War Relocation Authority was established in the Office of Emergency Management within
the Executive Office of the President to implement these internment policies.161 The U.S. government forcibly relocated thousands
of individuals, both U.S. citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry.
155. See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPAAMERICANS 3–6 (2001) (describing the process of Japanese internment).

NESE

156. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. § 1092 (1938–43).
157. Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing Any Act in Military Areas or Zones,
Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
158. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the curfew). No
distinction was made between Issei (first generation Japanese Americans) and Nisei (second
generation Japanese Americans).
159. NAT’L JACL POWER OF WORDS II COMM., POWER OF WORDS HANDBOOK 5 (2013),
https://jacl.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Power-of-Words-Rev.-Term.Handbook.pdf. This Article uses the standard nomenclature although it recognizes that internment camps could also be referred to as concentration camps and internment as
incarceration. See id. at 10–15; ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS
19–22 (2d ed. 2013); see also Yoshinori H.T. Himel, Americans’ Misuse of “Internment,” 14 SEATTLE. J. SOC. JUST. 797 (2016).
160. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at 167–68; see also
GREG ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF DEMOCRACY 154 (2009).
161. ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 160, at 106; YAMAMOTO ET AL.,
RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at 168–69; Eric L. Muller, Of Coercion and
Accommodation: Looking at Japanese American Imprisonment Through a Law Office Window, 35 L. &
HIST. REV. 277, 280 (2017).
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The Supreme Court considered the legitimacy of these military
orders in a series of decisions.162 In Hirabayashi v. United States, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of curfew and exclusion orders that only applied to individuals of Japanese
ancestry.163 Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi had been convicted of violating the curfew and exclusion orders, which he then challenged
as an unconstitutional delegation of authority by Congress and as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment.164 The Court determined that
Congress had lawfully ratified Executive Order No. 9066 through its
Act of March 21, 1942.165 Although the Court was troubled that the
orders were based on racial classifications, it found the national security considerations proffered by the government to be persuasive.
In a case of threatened danger requiring prompt action, it is a
choice between inflicting obviously needless hardship on the
many, or sitting passive and unresisting in the presence of the
threat. We think that constitutional government, in time of
war, is not so powerless and does not compel so hard a choice
if those charged with the responsibility of our national defense
have reasonable ground for believing that the threat is real.166
Three justices offered concurring opinions, two of which expressed
concerns about the broader implications of the decision.167 There
were no dissenting opinions. A companion case, Yasui v. United
States, similarly held that the curfew order was constitutional.168
In Korematsu v. United States, which was decided the following
year, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the exclusion order that prohibited individuals of Japanese ancestry,
including those who were U.S. citizens, from remaining in designated military areas.169 Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was convicted
of violating the exclusion order even though there were no questions regarding his loyalty to the United States.170 He challenged his
conviction on constitutional grounds. As in Hirabayashi, the Court
162. Several convictions arising out of these decisions were subsequently overturned in
coram nobis actions.
163. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
164. Id. at 83–84. See generally GORDON K. HIRABAYASHI, A PRINCIPLED STAND: THE STORY OF
Hirabayashi v. United States (2013).
165. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 91.
166. Id. at 95.
167. See id. at 105–14 (Douglas, Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., concurring).
168. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116–17 (1943).
169. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally LORRAINE K. BANNAI,
ENDURING CONVICTION (2015).
170. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–16.
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was troubled that the exclusion order solely targeted Japanese
Americans.171 However, it also found the national security considerations presented by the government to be dispositive, citing its
earlier reasoning in Hirabayashi.172 According to the Court, “[w]e
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.”173
For these reasons, the Court affirmed Korematsu’s conviction, albeit on limited grounds.174 The Court stated that “[w]e uphold the
exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner
violated it.”175 But unlike Hirabayashi, three justices dissented from
the majority opinion.176 All three dissenting justices agreed the exclusion order was unconstitutional because it was based on racial
classifications. In his forceful dissent, Justice Frank Murphy noted
the order was racist:
I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable
part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in
any setting, but it is utterly revolting among a free people who
have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of
the United States. All residents of this nation are kin in some
way by blood or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are primarily and necessarily a part of the new and distinct civilization of
the United States. They must, accordingly, be treated at all
times as the heirs of the American experiment, and as entitled
to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution.177
Ex Parte Endo was issued the same day as Korematsu.178 In this case,
the Supreme Court considered a petition for habeas corpus filed by
Mitsuye Endo, a U.S. citizen of Japanese ancestry who challenged
her detention at an internment camp.179 The Court acknowledged
that there was no dispute that Endo was a loyal citizen, and there
were no allegations that she supported the Japanese war effort or
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
1944).
179.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 225, 233, 242 (Roberts, Murphy & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (both decisions were issued on December 18,
Id. at 291–94.
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opposed the United States.180 The Court also found it significant
that neither Executive Order No. 9066 nor the subsequent Act of
Congress that ratified it included language authorizing detention.181 Such an omission distinguished Endo from prior cases.182
Under such circumstances, the Court found her detention unlawful. “When the power to detain is derived from the power to protect
the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has
no relationship to that objective is unauthorized.”183 For these reasons, Endo was entitled to unconditional release from internment.
By the end of the war, over 110,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry had been forced from their homes.184 Their freedom of
movement was highly regulated, and most were eventually interned
in camps. Calls for redress were initially muted. In 1948, Congress
adopted the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act, which authorized compensation to individuals who had suffered property
losses as a result of evacuation orders.185 Additional legislation offered limited social security and retirement benefits to individuals
who had been interned.186 In the 1970s, a growing community of
Japanese American activists supported, by the burgeoning civil
rights movement, issued renewed calls for redress.

B. The Road to Reparations
After extensive lobbying by the Japanese American community
and civil rights groups, Congress authorized the adoption of the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
Act in 1980.187 The Act acknowledged that thousands of U.S. citizens had been relocated and detained in internment camps during
the Second World War.188 It also determined that no inquiry had
been made into these matters. The Act established a bipartisan
Commission that was directed to:
180. Id. at 294.
181. Id. at 300–01.
182. See id. at 301.
183. Id. at 302.
184. ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 160, at 143; MITCHELL T. MAKI ET
AL., ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM 1 (1999).
185. Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act, Pub. L. 80-886, 62 Stat. 1231 (1948).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 431 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 8332(l) (2012).
187. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Pub. L. 96-317,
94 Stat. 964 (1980). See generally YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note
159, at 315; Eric K. Yamamoto & Liann Ebesugawa, Report on Redress: The Japanese American
Internment, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 257, 269–70 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); MAKI
ET AL., supra note 184, at 85–116.
188. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act § 2(a).
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(1) review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive
Order Numbered 9066, issued February 19, 1942, and the
impact of such Executive Order on American citizens and
permanent resident aliens;
(2) review directives of United States military forces requiring
the relocation and, in some cases, detention in internment camps of American citizens, including Aleut
civilians, and permanent residents of the Aleutian and
Pribilof Islands; and
(3) recommend appropriate remedies.189
The Commission was granted broad powers to investigate, and the
Attorney General was authorized to assist the Commission in gaining witness attendance and testimony as well as document
production.190 The Commission was empowered to establish its own
staff and seek the assistance of appropriate federal agencies.
In pursuing its mandate, the Commission studied historical
records and conducted multiple hearings throughout the United
States.191 It received testimony from hundreds of witnesses, including internees, former government officials, and military leaders.192
In February 1983, the Commission presented its monumental report, Personal Justice Denied, to Congress.193 Through its methodical
review of the historical record, it concluded that Executive Order
No. 9066 was not compelled by military necessity.194 Other factors,
including racial animus, had motivated the policies adopted against
persons of Japanese ancestry.
The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were
race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans
contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in any
atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was
done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative
189. Id. § 4(a).
190. Id. § 5(a).
191. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 1 (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED].
192. Id.
193. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED: PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1983) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: PART 2].
194. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 191, at 18.
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evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained
by the United States during World War II.195
In a subsequent report issued in June 1983, the Commission acknowledged U.S. responsibility for the internment and called for
several forms of redress.196 First, Congress should pass a Joint Resolution signed by the President apologizing on behalf of the nation
for the exclusion, removal, and detention policies.197 Second, the
President should pardon those individuals who were convicted of
violating curfew and removal laws that were based on discriminatory grounds.198 The Commission called on the Department of
Justice to review any wartime convictions that were based on an individual’s refusal to accept discriminatory treatment due to their
Japanese ancestry. Third, Congress should direct the appropriate
Executive agencies to consider applications for reinstatement of positions, status, or entitlements that were lost in whole or in part by
individuals of Japanese ancestry because of the events that occurred
during the Second World War.199 Fourth, Congress should appropriate funds to establish a special foundation that would support
research and educational activities regarding the discriminatory
policies that were applied to individuals of Japanese ancestry during
the Second World War.200 Finally, Congress should appropriate $1.5
billion for the payment of reparations as well as the establishment
of a foundation to support research and educational activities.201
The report recommended that compensatory payments of $20,000
should be provided to each of the “surviving persons [who were]
excluded from their places of residence pursuant to Executive Order 9066.”202 After such payments have been made, the remainder
of the fund would be used for research and educational activities,
including providing for “the general welfare of the Japanese American community.”203
The Commission also provided a set of recommendations to address the treatment of Aleuts during the Second World War. The
Aleuts, which included U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, had been forcibly removed from their homes on the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: PART 2, supra note 193.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9 n.1 (one member of the Commission dissented from this recommendation).
Id.
Id. at 10.
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Aleutian and Pribilof Islands. Unlike the treatment of individuals of
Japanese ancestry, “[t]he Commission found no persuasive showing
that evacuation of the Aleuts was motivated by racism or that it was
undertaken for any reason but their safety.”204 Rather, the evacuation orders were a legitimate wartime measure.205 Notwithstanding,
the Aleuts suffered the loss of their freedom as well as the loss of
land and property.206 The Commission recommended the establishment of a $5 million fund to be used for community and individual
purposes, including education, cultural, and historical rebuilding,
as well as for medical or social services.207 In addition, the Commission proposed that Congress should appropriate funds to rebuild
and restore churches damaged or destroyed in the Aleutian Islands
during the Second World War and should remove any debris remaining from the war.208 Congress should also declare that the
island of Attu be conveyed to the Aleuts.209 Finally, surviving Aleuts
who had been evacuated by the federal government should receive
a payment of $5,000.210
The Commission concluded its report by acknowledging the importance of accepting responsibility for past injustices. “It is our
belief that, though history cannot be unmade, it is well within our
power to offer help, and to acknowledge error.”211
While there was strong support for the Commission’s findings,
the issue of financial compensation generated extensive controversy.212 There was concern that providing reparations to Japanese
Americans would create a precedent for other groups such as Native Americans and African Americans.213 It was also argued that it
would be unfair to require current citizens to pay for the misdeeds
of prior generations.214 An alternative approach to reparations, a
class action lawsuit filed on behalf of victims of internment, proved
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 10–11.
207. Id. at 11–12.
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 13.
212. See ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL 98–102 (1993) (describing the
controversy).
213. Id. at 99; see also MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 141, 182 (generally discussing that
other groups might be entitled to reparations).
214. Japanese-American Evacuation Redress: Hearing on S. 1520 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice and Procedure of the S. Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong. 118 (1983) (statement of Representative Daniel E. Lundgren).
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unsuccessful.215 A different set of legal proceedings, however, were
successful and spurred renewed calls for reparations.
In 1983, Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu filed separate
coram nobis petitions in federal court seeking to vacate their earlier
convictions on account of governmental misconduct.216 They asserted the U.S. government had known that Japanese Americans
posed no security threat during the Second World War and that
this information had been suppressed during their criminal proceedings. Both petitions were eventually granted.217 A third petition
for coram nobis filed by Minoru Yasui, who had been convicted of
violating the curfew order, was denied although the district court
vacated his conviction.218 These decisions offered powerful support
to the growing movement for redress.219 As noted by Judge Marilyn
Patel in her decision to vacate Korematsu’s conviction.
Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very
limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity
our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional
guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the
shield of military necessity and national security must not be
used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and
accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative,
executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and
prejudices that are so easily aroused.220
The legitimacy of the Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions was further undermined by an acknowledgement in 2011 from the Office
of the Solicitor General that it had failed to inform the Supreme
Court of relevant evidence in these cases.221 According to Acting
Solicitor General Neal Katyal, the Solicitor General had failed to
215. Hohri v. United States, 847 F.2d 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
216. DANIELS, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES, supra note 153, at 170–73 (describing how
the case was filed); YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at 280.
217. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
218. Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1985).
219. MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 136.
220. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
221. Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/
confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases.
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provide candid representations to the Court in these cases, and this
was a mistake.

C. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988
After several years of heated negotiations, Congress adopted the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988.222 Its adoption was the result of extensive
lobbying by Japanese American advocacy groups and the influence
of several members of Congress who had themselves been interned
during the Second World War.223 The Act, which implemented the
Commission’s recommendations, was signed by President Ronald
Reagan on August 10, 1988. When President Reagan signed the
Act, he acknowledged the importance of accepting responsibility
for the injustices of the internment program. He said, “[N]o payment can make up for those lost years. So, what is most important
in this bill has less to do with property than with honor. For here we
admit a wrong; here we reaffirm our commitment as a nation to
equal justice under the law.”224 The Act offered a formal apology to
U.S. citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry for the
injustices caused by the evacuation, relocation, and internment programs implemented during the Second World War.225
The Congress recognizes that, as described by the Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, a grave
injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident
aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of civilians during World War II. As the Commission documents, these actions were carried out without
adequate security reasons and without any acts of espionage or
sabotage documented by the Commission, and were motivated
largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of
political leadership. The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered enormous damages, both material and
222. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50
U.S.C.A. § 4202 (West. 2017)).
223. See DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 212, at 88–106; MAKI ET AL., supra
note 184, at 64–188. Not all Japanese Americans supported the legislation. Some argued that
no payments could adequately compensate them for their suffering. See MAKI ET AL., supra
note 184, at 140–41; YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at
324.
224. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., Remarks on Signing the Bill Providing Restitution for the Wartime Internment of Japanese-American Civilians (Aug. 10, 1988), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36240.
225. Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 2(a).
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intangible, and there were incalculable losses in education and
job training, all of which resulted in significant human suffering for which appropriate compensation has not been made.
For these fundamental violations of the basic civil liberties and
constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese ancestry,
the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation.226
Congress offered a similar apology to Aleut civilian residents for
their relocation and mistreatment.227
The Act authorized the Attorney General to review cases where
U.S. citizens or permanent residents of Japanese ancestry were convicted of violating Executive Order No. 9066 or any other order or
law involving the evacuation, relocation, or internment of individuals solely on the basis of their Japanese ancestry and where the
convictions occurred because these individuals had refused to comply with such discriminatory treatment.228 The Attorney General
was authorized to recommend appropriate cases to the President
for pardon, and the President was requested to offer pardons to
those individuals.229 In addition, federal departments and agencies
were required to review with liberality the applications by individuals for reinstatement of positions, status, or entitlements that were
lost in whole or in part because of “any discriminatory act of the
United States Government against such individual[s] which was
based upon the individual’s Japanese ancestry and which occurred
during the evacuation, relocation, and internment period.”230
The Act established the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund.231
It also authorized the appropriation of $1.25 billion for the Fund.232
The Attorney General would use the Fund to pay eligible individuals $20,000 in reparations.233
[T]he term “eligible individual” means any individual of Japanese ancestry [or the spouse or a parent of an individual of
Japanese ancestry] who is living on the date of the enactment
of this Act and who, during the evacuation, relocation, and
internment period—
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2(b).
tit. I, § 102(a).
tit. I, § 102(b)–(c).
tit. I, § 103(a).
tit. I, § 104(a).
tit. I, § 104(e).
tit. I, § 105(a)(1).

198

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 51:1

(A) was a United States citizen or a permanent resident
alien; and
(B)(i) was confined, held in custody, relocated, or otherwise deprived of liberty or property as a result of—
(I) Executive Order Numbered 9066, dated February
19, 1942;
(II) the Act entitled “An Act to provide a penalty for
violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing
any act in military areas or zones”, approved March
21, 1942 (56 Stat. 173); or
(III) any other Executive order, Presidential proclamation, law of the United States, directive of the
Armed Forces of the United States, or other action
taken by or on behalf of the United States or its
agents, representatives, officers, or employees, respecting the evacuation, relocation, or internment of
individuals solely on the basis of Japanese ancestry; or
(ii) was enrolled on the records of the United States
Government during the period beginning on December
7, 1941, and ending on June 30, 1946, as being in a prohibited military zone;
except that the term “eligible individual” does not include any
individual who, during the period beginning on December 7,
1941, and ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a country while the United States was at war with that country;234
If an eligible individual was deceased, payment would be provided to their spouse, children, or parents who were living at the
time of payment.235 If such individuals did not exist, no payment
would be authorized. It took two years before Congress actually appropriated the funds authorized by the Civil Liberties Act.236

234. Id. tit. I, § 108(2). As enacted in 1988, the Act limited eligibility to those of Japanese
descent. The 1992 amendments added the following language: “or the spouse of a parent of
an individual of Japanese ancestry.” Civil Liberties Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-371,
§ 3, 106 Stat. 1167, 1067.
235. Id. tit. I, § 105(a)(7).
236. See MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 199–210 (describing the two year process).
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The Civil Liberties Act also established the Civil Liberties Public
Education Fund Board of Directors.237 The President was authorized to appoint the Board with Senate advice and consent.238 The
Board was authorized to use the Public Education Fund:
[T]o sponsor research and public educational activities, and to
publish and distribute the hearings, findings, and recommendations of the Commission, so that the events surrounding the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry will
be remembered, and so that the causes and circumstances of
this and similar events may be illuminated and
understood . . . .239
To implement the Civil Liberties Act, the Department of Justice
established the Office of Redress Administration (ORA) within the
Civil Rights Division.240 ORA’s primary responsibility was to oversee
the reparations administration process, which included identifying
and authorizing payments to eligible individuals. To identify potential claimants, it engaged in extensive outreach to the Japanese
American community in the United States.241 It publicized the program in various newspapers and scheduled information sessions to
further promote its work. It even engaged in outreach to Japan and
throughout Latin America.242 Individuals were not required to apply for reparations although they could affirmatively notify ORA of
their eligibility.243 ORA was responsible for reviewing the eligibility
of individuals for reparations and disbursing payments.244 It also established an appeals process to consider the claims of individuals
who were deemed ineligible for reparations.245
237. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, tit. I, § 106(a).
238. Id. tit. I, § 106(c)(1).
239. Id. tit. I, § 106(b)(1).
240. Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,157-01 (Aug.
18, 1989) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 74); see also Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese
Ancestry, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,291-01 (June 14, 1989) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 74).
241. Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,157.
242. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ten Year Program to Compensate Japanese
Americans Interned During World War II Closes Its Doors (Feb. 19, 1999), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1999/February/059cr.htm.
243. Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,160.
244. Id. at 34,157.
245. Id. at 34,161. ORA also considered whether it was appropriate to expand the scope
of eligibility for reparations, including Peruvian Japanese who were brought to the United
States during World War II, minors who were repatriated to Japan during World War II, and
voluntary evacuees who did not complete “Change of Residence” cards. See Individuals of
Japanese Ancestry Who Were Interned During World War II, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,252-01 (Oct. 20,
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The first reparation payments were made on October 9, 1990
and were presented by the Attorney General to nine elderly survivors at a formal ceremony in the Great Hall of the Department of
Justice.246 Each survivor received a check for $20,000 and an acknowledgement letter from President George H.W. Bush.247 In
subsequent years, Congress adopted several amendments to the
Civil Liberties Act. In the Civil Liberties Act Amendments of 1992,
Congress increased the amount of the Fund from $1.25 billion to
$1.65 billion.248 It broadened the scope of eligibility.249 It added a
provision that would give claimants the benefit of the doubt in situations where there was “an approximate balance of positive and
negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the
determination of eligibility.”250 And, it added a judicial review provision allowing unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review before
the United States Claims Court (which was subsequently revised to
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims).251 Upon signing the Civil Liberties Act Amendments, President Bush recognized the significance
of the legislation but also its limitations by acknowledging that
“[n]o monetary payments can ever fully compensate loyal Japanese
Americans for one of the darkest incidents in American constitutional history. We must do everything possible to ensure that such a
grave wrong is never repeated.”252
While the Civil Liberties Act authorized the establishment of the
Civil Liberties Public Education Fund Board of Directors, it took
several years before the Board was formally established. In 1996,
President Bill Clinton appointed eight individuals to serve on the
Board.253 Pursuant to the Civil Liberties Act, the Board was charged
1988) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 74); see also Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry: Guidelines for Individuals Who Relocated to Japan as Minors During World War II, 61
Fed. Reg. 51,008-01, 51,110 (Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 74); Redress Provisions
for Persons of Japanese Ancestry, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,667, 17,669 (Apr. 22, 1996) (codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 74).
246. MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 213.
247. See DANIELS, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES, supra note 153, at 161. Some commentators have indicated that President Bush’s letter did not include a formal apology. In contrast,
they point out that President Bill Clinton’s letter to internees included an explicit apology.
E.g., id. at 161–62.
248. Civil Liberties Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-371, § 2, 106 Stat. 1167.
249. Id. § 7.
250. Id. § 4(a).
251. Id. § 4(b).
252. George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., Presidential Statement on Signing the
Civil Liberties Act Amendments of 1992 (Sept. 27, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=21521.
253. MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 226.
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with funding research and public education activities relating to internment.254 Eventually, the Fund was used to support a variety of
projects, including “curriculum, landmarks/exhibits, art/media,
community development, research, research resources, and national fellowships.”255 Substantively, the projects addressed
numerous issues, including the stories of “Nisei veterans, the role of
Nisei women, Japanese Latin Peruvians, those interned in Department of Justice camps, the effects of incarceration on Sansei and
Yonsei, the experience of Hawaiians during World War II, the role
of the Military Intelligence Services, those who resisted incarceration, and the redress movement.”256 Project recipients included
“museums, resource libraries, state arts and humanities councils, K12 school teachers, universities, research institutes, community colleges, National Asian American organizations, artists and theater
groups, graduate students, those who were incarcerated and other
talented individuals knowledgeable about the lessons learned from
the incarceration.”257 In total, the Board distributed 132 grants totaling $3.3 million.258 In addition, it scheduled a National Day of
Remembrance on February 19, 1998, and a national conference for
all grant recipients in June 1998.259 It also transcribed the earlier
hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians and re-published Personal Justice Denied.260
Over $1.6 billion was eventually distributed from the Fund.261
There were 82,219 individuals of Japanese ancestry who were forcibly evacuated, relocated, and interned that received reparation
254. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 106(b)(1), 102 Stat. 903, 908
(1988).
255. CLPEF Background, CLPEF NETWORK, http://www.momomedia.com/CLPEF/
backgrnd.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The grant records for the Civil Liberties Public
Education Fund Grant Program are located at the Japanese American National Museum.
Finding Aid for the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund Grant Program Records, ONLINE ARCHIVE
CAL., http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt3c6033q1/ (last visited Oct. 22,
2017).
256. CLPEF Background, supra note 255.
257. Id. See also YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at
324–25.
258. MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 227.
259. CLPEF Background, supra note 255.
260. Id.; see also PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 191.
261. Mark K. Hanasono, Note, Stranded in Japan and the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 Recognition for an Excluded Group of Japanese Americans, 6 ASIAN AM. L.J. 151, 154 (1999); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ten Year Program to Compensate Japanese Americans Interned During
World War II Closes Its Doors, supra note 242. Not all individuals subject to detention during
World War II were offered redress. See Hanasono, supra, at 154 (1999); Joseph C. Mauro,
Note, Wartime Prejudice Against Persons of Italian Descent: Does the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 Violate
Equal Protection?, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 445, 448 (2010).
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payments of $20,000 and a presidential apology.262 Upon completing its work, the Office of Redress Administration officially closed
on February 5, 1999.263 At the time, Assistant Attorney General Bill
Lann Lee acknowledged the success of the reparations program. In
a public statement, Lee noted that “[t]his is a great example of a
program that worked . . . . We set out to locate every possible claimant who was interned nearly half a century ago. And through our
efforts, we have accounted for almost 99% of them. That’s a remarkable accomplishment.”264 In subsequent years, the United
States took additional steps to memorialize the ignominy surrounding Japanese internment. In 2006, for example, Congress
authorized government funds “to provide for the preservation of
the historic confinement sites where Japanese Americans were detained during World War II.”265 Activists such as Gordon
Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Minoru Yasui were each awarded
the Presidential Medal of Freedom for their actions opposing the
discriminatory policies that affected thousands of innocent Americans during the Second World War.266

D. Extending the Reparations Program
One of the final battles of the reparations movement concerned
the plight of individuals of Japanese ancestry living in Latin American countries during the Second World War and who were
detained and brought to the United States at the request of the
U.S. government.267 These individuals were not U.S. citizens or permanent residents. Most were nationals of Latin American countries.
Significantly, they posed no threat to the United States or even
their home countries. Rather, their relocation and internment was
“motivated by a desire to increase the number of persons who could
262. Press, Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ten Year Program, supra note 242.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Preservation of Historic Japanese Confinement Sites, Pub. L. No. 109-441, 120 Stat.
3288 (2006).
266. Frances Kai-Hwa Wang, Minoru Yasui to Receive Presidential Medal of Freedom, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2015, 1:05 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/minoru-yasui-receive-presidential-medal-freedom-n464971. Unlike Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred
Korematsu, and Minoru Yasui, Mitsuye Endo was not awarded the Presidential Medal of
Freedom.
267. See generally P. SCOTT CORBETT, QUIET PASSAGES 139–66 (1987); C. HARVEY GARDINER,
PAWNS IN A TRIANGLE OF HATE (1981); Ayako Hagihara & Grace Shimizu, The Japanese Latin
American Wartime and Redress Experience, 28 AMERASIA J. 203 (2002) (concluding by calling for
the United States to provide redress to an estimated 2,000 Japanese Latin Americans who
were still denied equitable redress in 2002).
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potentially be exchanged for U.S. civilians and military personnel
in Japanese custody.”268 Approximately 2,300 individuals of Japanese descent from thirteen Latin American countries were
eventually detained in the United States.269 The United States then
exchanged hundreds of these individuals for U.S. citizens and military personnel who were being held as prisoners of war in Japan.270
When the exchange program ended, over 1,000 Japanese Latin
Americans remained interned in the United States.271 At the end of
the war, the United States deported the majority of these individuals to Japan, a country most of them had never visited.272
During the negotiations for the Civil Liberties Act, Congress
briefly considered the eligibility of Japanese Latin Americans for
reparations.273 Because these individuals were not U.S. citizens or
permanent residents at the time of their internment, they were
eventually found to be ineligible. On May 20, 1997, five of these
individuals brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims seeking reparations under the Civil Liberties Act. In
Mochizuki v. United States, the U.S. government agreed to a proposed
settlement that would provide class members with a reparations
payment of $5,000 and a presidential apology.274 When the court
approved the final settlement, it acknowledged the tragic experiences of the plaintiffs and the suffering they endured.275
Eventually, 145 individuals were provided reparation payments of
$5,000 and received a presidential apology.276 There was significant
dissatisfaction with the terms of the settlement, however, including
by those individuals who were approved for reparations. Some argued that they should be entitled to the same amount received by
268. S. REP. No. 111-112, at 2 (2009).
269. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 191, at 305.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 311.
272. Id. at 311–12; see also Hagihara & Shimizu, supra note 267, at 212–13.
273. MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 222; YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at 345; Hagihara & Shimizu, supra note 267, at 210–13.
274. Mochizuki v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 54, 55–57 (1998).
275. Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97, 97 (1999). The court included the personal statements of the class members to the opinion, “so that their account of those trying
times can be more widely known.” Id.
276. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Japanese Latin Americans to Receive Compensation for Internment During World War II (June 12, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/archive/
opa/pr/1998/June/276.htm.html; Search the Compensation and Reparations for the Evacuation,
Relocation, and Internment Index (Redress Case Files), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/
research/japanese-americans/redress#ora (last updated Feb. 22, 2017) (providing information on the 145 individuals receiving reparation payments). See generally MAKI ET AL., supra
note 184, at 222; YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at
344–50; Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World
War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians—A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV. 275 (1998).
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Japanese Americans who had been detained. Others argued that
more individuals should have received reparation payments. As a
result, several efforts were made to establish a new commission to
investigate the relocation, internment, and deportation of “Latin
Americans of Japanese descent” and to recommend appropriate
remedies.277 In 2009, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs conducted hearings on the treatment of
Latin Americans of Japanese descent during the Second World
War.278 The Committee acknowledged that “further work remains”
and proposed the establishment of a commission to “investigate
and determine facts and circumstances surrounding the relocation,
internment, and deportation to Axis countries of Latin Americans
of Japanese descent.”279 Despite these pronouncements, Congress
took no further legislative action. Litigation on behalf of Japanese
Latin Americans in U.S. courts and before international tribunals
has also proven unsuccessful.280
In the United States, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 remains the
best example of official redress for past injustices.281 A handful of
other redress movements have occurred in the United States.282
Some of these movements were successful; most were not. But as
President Bush indicated in his letter to the recipients of reparations under the Civil Liberties Act, even the most successful
examples of official redress must acknowledge the limits of
legislation.
A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or
erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation’s resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the rights of
277. See, e.g., S. 69, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 42, 111th Cong. (2009).
278. See S. 2553, 102d Cong. (1992); see also Treatment of Latin Americans of Japanese Descent,
European Americans, and Jewish Refugees During World War II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Japanese Latin Americans Hearing] (the House also conducted hearings on the issue).
279. S. REP. No. 111-112, at 1, 3 (2009).
280. Japanese Latin American Hearing, supra note 278, at 94; see, e.g., Shibayama v. United
States, 55 Fed. Cl. 720 (2002); Shima v. Ashcroft, 11 Fed. Appx. 923 (9th Cir. 2001); Kato v.
United States, 1 Fed. Appx. 630 (9th Cir. 2001); Shibayama v. United States, Case 434-03,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 26/06, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007).
281. Canada adopted a similar reparations program to address its own mistreatment of
Japanese Canadians during the Second World War. ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 160, at 301–02. In addition, both California and Washington adopted legislation
providing payments to individuals who had been terminated from state jobs because of their
Japanese ancestry during the Second World War. MAKI ET AL., supra note 184, at 117–21.
282. Other examples include the reparations movements for African Americans and Native Americans. See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 233–438 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999);
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS, supra note 159, at 331–78.
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individuals. We can never fully right the wrongs of the past.
But we can take a clear stand for justice and recognize that
serious injustices were done . . . .283

III. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL:
THE CIVIL REDRESS AND HISTORICAL MEMORY ACT
OF 2029
The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029 appears in
full as an Appendix to this Article. It is modeled after the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 and also incorporates several provisions from the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
Act of 1980.284 The Act is designed to address the cases of El-Masri,
Arar, Meshal, and many others—individuals who were wrongfully
detained and abused by the U.S. government or by other countries
with the complicity of the United States during the War on Terror,
and yet who were innocent and were never offered any redress by
the United States.

A. The Need for Redress and Memory
Echoing the words of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, the Civil
Redress and Historical Memory Act would acknowledge the fundamental injustices committed by the United States during the War
on Terror and accept responsibility for these actions. Congress
should adopt this legislation for several reasons.285
First, many individuals detained and abused during the War on
Terror were innocent. They committed no crime and posed no
threat to the United States. They lost their freedom and the ability
to live a life of their own choosing. They lost time with family and
friends. They certainly should not have been subjected to mistreatment. These individuals suffered physical and mental abuse during
283. Letter from President George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S. to Internees (Oct.
1991) (on file with California State University—Sacramento, Department of Special Collections and University Archives).
284. In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., the Ninth Circuit cited the reparation program
offered to Japanese Latin Americans who were abducted and interned in the United States
during the Second World War as an example of how the United States could compensate
individuals subjected to rendition. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091
(9th Cir. 2010).
285. On the various reasons for providing redress, see Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note
8, at 149–67.
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their detention.286 Some were even tortured.287 For many of these
individuals, their suffering continues long after their release.288
Individuals who have been harmed in such a manner should be
provided redress.289 An apology acknowledges their suffering and
accepts responsibility for it. In fact, the failure to acknowledge such
suffering and accept responsibility perpetuates the anguish of victims, who may feel dismissed in the face of such denial.290
Reparations offer financial compensation for the physical and
mental suffering of the victims.291 Reparations can also provide financial assistance to individuals who may have incurred medical
bills and similar expenses as a result of their mistreatment. While
compensation seldom offers full satisfaction for lost freedom and is
a poor proxy for pain and suffering, it is a common remedy and
important nonetheless.292 In approving the final settlement for
those individuals of Japanese ancestry who had been deported from
Latin American countries and interned in the United States, the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims acknowledged both the importance
and the limits of financial compensation.
No settlement is ever perfect. No compensation is ever
equivalent to a serious human loss. Who among us would ever
trade our eyes or legs for $5,000 or $20,000 or a hundred
286. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., U.S. Torture Leaves a Legacy of Detainees with Damaged
Minds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/cia-tortureguantanamo-bay.html; Editorial, Torture and its Psychological Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/opinion/torture-and-its-psychological-after
math.html?_r=0.
287. See supra note 286.
288. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other physical and medical conditions are
often experienced by survivors of torture. See Alexander C. McFarlane, Assessing PTSD and
Comorbidity: Issues in Differential Diagnosis, in BROKEN SPIRITS 81 (John P. Wilson et al. eds.,
2004); Angela Nickerson et al., Emotional Suppression in Torture Survivors: Relationship to Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms and Trauma-Related Negative Affect, 242 PSYCHIATRY RES. 233 (2016);
Raija-Leena Punamäki et al., Nature of Torture, PTSD, and Somatic Symptoms Among Political ExPrisoners, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 532 (2010); Thomas Wenzel et al., The DSM 5 and the Istanbul Protocol: Diagnosis of Psychological Sequels of Torture, 25 TORTURE 51 (2015).
289. See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 19–20
(3d ed. 2015); Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,
455–61 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 8.
290. See de Greiff, supra note 289, at 460–61; Trudy Govier, What is Acknowledgment and
Why is it Important?, in DILEMMAS OF RECONCILIATION 65, 85 (Carol A.L. Prager & Trudy
Govier eds., 2003) (“When there is no acknowledgement of the wrongdoing, the initial
wound develops into ‘the second wound of silence . . . .’ ”); Martha Minow, The Hope for
Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 235, 242 (Robert I. Rotberg &
Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
291. SHELTON, supra note 289, at 18–19.
292. See, e.g., Noel King, For Men Tortured by Chicago Police, Payments Only Go So Far in
Repairing Lives, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (July 27, 2016, 5:15 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/
27/487577902/for-men-tortured-by-chicago-police-payments-only-go-so-far-in-repairing-lives.
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times that much? Money damages can never undo the loss of
life, false imprisonment or the passage of years. Money, however, is the medium which the law must use as it seeks to right
wrongs. It must use this medium with the full recognition that
it is never truly adequate.293
The right to a remedy is well established in both domestic and
international law. It is, in fact, required under international law.
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), a treaty signed and ratified by the United States,
requires compensation for wrongful detention.294 Specifically, Article 9(5) provides that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”295 And, more broadly, Article 2(3) provides that “any
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy, . . .”296 The right to a remedy is codified in other international agreements and has attained the status
of customary international law.297 While the United States has
deemed the ICCPR to be non-self-executing, meaning its provisions
are not enforceable in U.S. courts, this does not mitigate its international status.298 The United States is thus obligated to provide
reparations to victims.
Second, the legislation would affirm the importance of international law and human rights. The Act acknowledges the United
States is bound to respect and protect the human rights of individuals who are under its control regardless of where they are located or
their nationality. The Act also acknowledges such obligations even
extend to situations where individuals are held by other countries if
the United States is complicit or otherwise responsible in their detention or mistreatment. Acknowledging responsibility and
providing reparations would strengthen the credibility of U.S. commitments to respect international law and human rights. These
actions would also legitimize U.S. statements denouncing human
rights violations committed by other countries. The credibility of
the U.S. commitment to respect human rights has been damaged
293. Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97, 97 (1999).
294. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(5), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
295. Id.
296. Id. art. 2(3)(a).
297. See Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. WGAD/CRP.1/
2015 (2015).
298. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S.
Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51 (2012).
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because of its behavior during the War on Terror. As a result, many
countries have condemned the United States for its human rights
record, from Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo.299 Several international
organizations and human rights monitoring bodies have also expressed grave concern about U.S. policies and actions.300 And
numerous human rights organizations have similarly denounced
the United States for its conduct during the War on Terror.301 The
Act offers a meaningful response to these concerns.
Third, the legislation would provide a historical record of the
abuses committed by the United States during the War on Terror.
To individual victims, a record offers an explanation for their suffering.302 Moreover, it gives them the opportunity to clear their
name.303 But a detailed record also serves a broader audience.304 It
is an acknowledgment to the American polity and the international
community. And, it is a statement to both present and future generations. It documents the truth and removes the facts from
contention.305 Like the right to a remedy, the right to truth is also
recognized under international law.306 An honest record explains
299. See, e.g., Joerg Wolf, German Chancellor Calls for Closure of Guantanamo, ATLANTIC REV.
(Jan. 9, 2006), http://atlanticreview.org/archives/247-German-Chancellor-calls-for-closureof-Guantanamo.html.
300. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. on Human Rights, Towards the Closure of Guantanamo Bay,
O.A.S. Doc. OAS/Ser.L/V/II (June 3, 2015); Comm. against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of the United States of America, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Dec. 19, 2014); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014).
301. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, New Call from National and International Rights
Groups on the Need to Ensure Accountability for the U.S. CIA Torture Program, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/29/NGO/119 (June 24, 2015).
302. See generally SUSAN F. HIRSCH, IN THE MOMENT OF GREATEST CALAMITY (2006); M.
Brinton Lykes & Marcie Mersky, Reparations and Mental Health: Psychosocial Interventions Towards Healing, Human Agency, and Rethreading Social Realities, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS 589 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
303. Savage, supra note 13, at SR-7.
304. See generally SHELTON, supra note 289, at 22–37; LARRY WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 4 (1990); Pok Yin S. Chow, Memory Denied: A Commentary on the Reports of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights on Historical and Memorial Narratives in Divided Societies,
48 INT’L L. 191 (2015); Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A Psychological Perspective on Reparations in Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 560 (Pablo
de Greiff ed., 2006); Patrick Macklem, Rybná 9, Praha 1: Restitution and Memory in International
Human Rights Law, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005).
305. Hafetz, supra note 12, at 431 (“[R]esistance to accountability helps propagate a competing narrative surrounding torture that legitimi[z]es utilitarian arguments, undermines
categorical moral judgements and perpetuates a national security exceptionalism.”).
306. See generally Sam Szoke-Burke, Searching for the Right to Truth: The Impact of International Human Rights Law on National Transitional Justice Policies, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 526
(2015); Dermot Groome, The Right to Truth in the Fight Against Impunity, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 175 (2011); Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 88 INT’L
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what caused the violations to occur and identifies both victims and
perpetrators. A historical record also offers clear evidence that torture and other forms of abuse are counterproductive.307
Acknowledgement is thus important to both the victim and the
perpetrator.308
Finally, redress and memory can prevent future abuses.309 Redress attaches a financial cost to wrongs and may prevent them by
monetizing the consequences of rule violations.310 Similarly, memories of the past guide a country on how to act in the future. A clear
historical record aids accurate recollection of the past and discourages countries from discounting the cost of abuses. This reminder
makes it harder to repeat the mistakes of the past.311 Of course,
such efforts cannot guarantee abuses will never occur again. Indeed, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 did not prevent the abuses
perpetrated during the War on Terror. However, the alternative is
even worse. The failure to denounce abuses may create a culture of
impunity that encourages repetition of these acts.
Because of their own experiences, it is not surprising that Japanese Americans who were interned during the Second World War
have criticized the treatment of detainees during the War on Terror. On several occasions, these survivors have denounced
restrictions on civil liberties and human rights, including the indefinite detention of foreign nationals.312 In 2004, for example, Fred
Korematsu submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in
Rasul v. Bush challenging the detention of detainees at Guantanamo and the refusal to provide them with due process and judicial
REV. RED CROSS 245 (2006); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Note, Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 977 (2002).
307. See SHANE O’MARA, WHY TORTURE DOESN’T WORK (2015); Douglas A. Johnson et al.,
The Strategic Costs of Torture: How “Enhanced Interrogation” Hurt America, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 121; William H. Taft IV, Opinion, Reveal What U.S. Torture Cost Us, WASH.
POST (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reveal-what-us-torturecost-us/2013/12/12/b23bf570-61c4-11e3-bf45-61f69f54fc5f_story.html
?utm_term=.4c67fa9045e6.
308. Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 149–66.
309. See generally BURYING THE PAST (Nigel Biggar ed., 2003); NETA C. CRAWFORD, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLING (2013).
310. See SHELTON, supra note 289, at 22, 28; JEREMY SARKIN, COLONIAL GENOCIDE AND REPARATIONS CLAIMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 144 (2009).
311. See generally Groome, supra note 306 (describing the various ways in which the right
to truth promotes accountability and combats impunity).
312. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Ken Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly Yasui in
Support of Appellants, Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 141688), 2014 WL 3572026; Brief of Amici Curiae Karen and Ken Korematsu; Holly, Iris, and
Laurel Dee Yasui; Jay Hirabayashi, Sharon Mitsu Yuen, and Marion Setsu Oldenburg in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013)
(Nos. 12-3176 and 12-3644), 2012 WL 6622648.
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review.313 Korematsu based the submission on his own unique experience in having his civil liberties restricted in a time of conflict.
Although certain aspects of the “war against terrorism” may be
unprecedented, the challenges to constitutional liberties these
cases present are similar to those the nation has encountered
throughout its history. The extreme nature of the Government’s position here is all too familiar as well. When viewed in
its historical context, the Government’s position is part of a
pattern whereby the executive branch curtails civil liberties
much more than necessary during wartime and seeks to insulate the basis for its actions from any judicial scrutiny. Only
later are errors acknowledged and apologies made.314
Korematsu called on the United States to not repeat the mistakes of
the past and to provide detainees with the right to challenge their
detentions in federal court.315
The importance of redress and memory to victims of abuse is
best exemplified in the personal experiences of Maher Arar and
Khaled El-Masri. Following an exhaustive public inquiry, the Canadian government formally apologized to Maher Arar for its role in
his rendition, detention, and torture and provided him $10 million
in reparations.316 Since then, Arar has been able to move forward,
to renew his life with his family, and to give back to his community.317 According to Arar, “my ordeal made me want to create
something that is useful for the world. I want to help improve the
situation we are in.”318 Regrettably, El-Masri’s experience has been
far different. When he explained the reasons for his lawsuit against
the United States, he expressed a desire to clear his name and to
receive an apology for the suffering he endured.319 According to El313. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334), 2004 WL 103832.
314. Id. at 2.
315. Id. at 3.
316. Julie Ireton, ‘This is Who I Am’: The Reinvention of Maher Arar, CBC NEWS (Apr. 22,
2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/maher-arar-reinvention1.3541273.
317. See Colby Itkowitz, From Tortured Terrorist Suspect to Entrepreneur: How This Canadian
Father Got His Life Back, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/inspired-life/wp/2016/04/27/from-accused-terrorist-to-canadian-entrepreneur-maherarar-is-finally-getting-his-life-back/?utm_term=.9c0603b49dc9.
318. Ireton, supra note 316.
319. Khaled El-Masri, I Am Not a State Secret, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007), http://
www.latimes.com/news/la-oe-elmasri3mar03-story.html (“Above all, what I want from the
lawsuit is a public acknowledgement from the U.S. government that I was innocent, a mistaken victim of its rendition program, and an apology for what I was forced to endure.”).
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Masri, “[w]ithout this vindication, it has been impossible for me to
return to a normal life.”320 And yet, he never received this vindication. His personal struggles reveal the life of a “broken man;” one
who was never able to recover from the trauma he endured.321 The
U.S. government’s refusal to provide any remedy to El-Masri is particularly outrageous because the CIA has acknowledged that he was
wrongfully detained.322

B. The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029
The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act has several purposes, which are acknowledged at the outset of the legislation. The
Act’s purposes are to:
(1) authorize a commission of inquiry to investigate and determine the facts surrounding cases involving the
detention and mistreatment of individuals during the War
on Terror;
(2) acknowledge the fundamental injustices committed
against those individuals who did not engage in hostilities
during the War on Terror and were neither terrorists nor
associated with any terror groups and yet were detained
and mistreated abroad by the United States, or by another
country with the complicity of the United States, any time
between September 1, 2001 and the date of enactment of
this Act, and who were subsequently released and never
charged or convicted by the United States;
(3) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for
these actions;
(4) provide reparations to these individuals;
(5) offer recommendations so that the causes and circumstances regarding these cases are better understood and
never repeated; and
320. Id.
321. Assoc. Press, Attorney: CIA Torture to Blame for Arson, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2007, 10:53
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/10/AR200712100
2257.html; Matthew Schofield, Yet No Apology: CIA’s Mistaken Detention Destroyed German Man’s
Life, MCCLATCHY DC (Dec. 13, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nationworld/world/article24777424.html.
322. See S. REP. NO. 113–288, at 128-29 (2014).

212

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 51:1

(6) establish a public education fund to finance efforts to
publicize the Commission’s findings and highlight the significance of human rights.
The Act offers a formal apology issued by Congress to affected individuals on behalf of the United States.
The Congress recognizes a fundamental injustice was done to
individuals who did not engage in hostilities during the War
on Terror and were neither terrorists nor associated with any
terror groups and yet were detained and mistreated abroad by
the United States, or by other countries with the complicity of
the United States, any time between September 1, 2001 and
the date of enactment of this Act, and who were subsequently
released and never charged or convicted by the United States.
For these fundamental violations of basic civil liberties and
human rights, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the
nation.
Title I of the Act establishes the Commission on Civil Redress
and Historical Memory (Commission).323 The Commission would
be composed of nine members with lifetime appointments. To promote its legitimacy and bipartisanship, three members would be
appointed each by the President, the Speaker of the House, and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate. The congressional appointments would be based on the joint recommendations of the
majority and minority leaders of the respective houses of Congress.
Officers or employees of the U.S. government would not be eligible
for Commission appointments. Commissioners would serve without
compensation although they would be reimbursed for travel and
business-related expenses. The Commission would be authorized to
employ such personnel as needed in the performance of its duties.
Any employee of the federal government may be detailed to assist
the Commission. Congress is authorized to appropriate $20 million
to fund the operations of the Commission. Such funds would remain available, without fiscal year limitation, until expended.
The Commission would hold its first meeting within ninety days
from the enactment of the Act. At this initial meeting, the members
of the Commission would select a Chairperson and Vice Chairperson. The Commission is authorized to:
323. The structure and language of the Act, including the formation and format of the
Commission, are based on the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act of 1980 and the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.
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(1) investigate and determine the facts in cases of individuals
who did not engage in hostilities during the War on Terror and were neither terrorists nor associated with any
terror groups and yet were detained and mistreated
abroad by the United States, or by other countries with
the complicity of the United States, any time between September 1, 2001 and the date of enactment of this Act, and
who were subsequently released and never charged or
convicted by the United States;
(2) provide reparations to these individuals;
(3) offer recommendations so that the causes and circumstances regarding these cases are better understood and
never repeated;
(4) distribute its findings and recommendations to the general public; and
(5) develop and implement a public education program to inform the public about human rights.
The Commission thus incorporates the work performed by the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
and the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund Board of Directors.
To fulfill its responsibilities, the Commission would hold public
hearings both in the United States and abroad. At its discretion, the
Commission may also hold private and confidential hearings. The
Commission would have the authority to issue subpoenas to compel
the appearance of witnesses as well as the production of documents
or other evidence. The Commission may request information from
any federal department or agency that is necessary to perform its
duties. Upon request, the appropriate department or agency head
would furnish such information to the Commission. The Clerk of
the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate are
also authorized to make available any congressional records for use
by the Commission. Subject to appropriate clearance requirements
and security procedures, the Commission would be provided access
to classified documents. If any department or agency refuses to
comply with the Commission’s request for information or the production of documents, it would create a rebuttable presumption
that the information would have benefitted the individual in determining eligibility. This provision is meant to address the problems
faced by victims whose efforts to pursue legal claims have been
thwarted by the assertion of state secrets, immunity, or other
privileges.
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The Commission is responsible for identifying and locating eligible individuals for reparations. The Commission may delegate the
identification and location of eligible individuals to the Attorney
General although the Commission would make the final decision
on eligibility. Individuals may notify the Commission that they are
candidates for eligibility. In addition, a spouse or domestic partner,
child, or parent may also notify the Commission on behalf of an
individual who is deceased or incapacitated. The identification and
location of all eligible individuals would begin with the Commission’s first meeting and would be completed within twelve months
of that initial meeting. All payments to eligible individuals would be
completed within twenty-four months of the Commission’s initial
meeting.
An eligible individual is defined as any individual who did not
engage in hostilities during the War on Terror and was neither a
terrorist nor associated with any terror groups and yet was detained
and mistreated abroad by the United States or by another country
with the complicity of the United States, any time between
September 1, 2001 and the date of enactment of the Act, and who
was subsequently released and never charged or convicted by the
United States. Thus, the United States is responsible even when individuals are held by other countries if the United States is
complicit or otherwise responsible for their detention or mistreatment. For purposes of the Act, mistreatment is defined as the
violation of any internationally recognized human rights, including
arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.324 Individuals who have accepted and
received payment pursuant to an award of a final judgment or a
settlement on a claim against the United States for such detention
and mistreatment would not be eligible. The Commission has exclusive authority to determine whether someone is an eligible
individual. When there is an approximate balance of positive and
negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue that is material
to the determination of eligibility, the Commission would offer the
benefit of the doubt to the individual in resolving such issue. Decisions on eligibility would require a majority vote of the
324. These international norms appear in various federal statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2340A (2012) (criminal prosecution for torture); 22 U.S.C. § 2151-1 (2012) (restrictions on
development assistance when countries violate internationally recognized human rights, including torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and prolonged detention without
charge); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) (2012) (civil liability for torture and extrajudicial killing);
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2015 app. A (2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253263.pdf.
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Commission. The Commission would compile an administrative record that documents its decision-making regarding each individual
it considers for eligibility.
Anyone whose claim is denied by the Commission may seek judicial review of such denial solely in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
Judicial review of such denials would be based on the administrative
record. The court would set aside the denial if it is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Within twelve months of its first meeting, the Commission would
submit an initial report to Congress describing its work and the status of its inquiry. Within twenty-four months of its first meeting, the
Commission would submit a second report to Congress that examines the causes and circumstances regarding these cases of arbitrary
detention and mistreatment committed by the United States during
the War on Terror. It would include recommendations that address
how such acts can be prevented from occurring. Thereafter, the
Commission would submit periodic reports to Congress every
twelve months and a final report within five years of its first
meeting.
During this time frame, the Commission would also develop and
implement a public education program to inform the public about
human rights. This work can comprise a variety of activities, including developing educational programs for primary, secondary, and
university students and providing competitive grants for academic
research, artistic displays, and community outreach. These projects
can take place in the United States and abroad, and project applicants need not be U.S. citizens. Substantively, the projects can
encompass numerous issues, ranging from civil and political rights
to economic, social, and cultural rights. They can include conflict
resolution, community building, leadership development, and the
promotion of social inclusion, tolerance, and respect. These
projects can address the rights and responsibilities of both state and
non-state actors, including individuals. The Commission would coordinate its public education program with federal agencies and
departments, including the Department of Justice, Department of
State, and Department of Education.
The duties of the Commission would terminate one year after its
final report is submitted to Congress. All documents, personal testimony, and other records created or received by the Commission
would be kept and maintained by the Archivist of the United States
and would be stored in the National Archives. These records would
be available to the general public for review, both at the National
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Archives and online. Classified documents would not be released.
However, the Commission would request declassification by the appropriate government agencies of all relevant documents.
Title II of the Act establishes the Civil Redress and Historical
Memory Fund (Fund). Congress is authorized to appropriate $100
million for the Fund.325 Any appropriated amounts would remain
available, without fiscal year limitation, until expended. The Fund
would be established in the Treasury of the United States and
would be administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Fund
would be used for two purposes. First, it would be used to provide
reparation payments to eligible individuals identified by the Commission. Any remaining amounts in the Fund would be used to
assist the Commission in distributing its findings and recommendations and to develop and implement a public education program
about human rights.
When possible, the Commission would make payments from the
Fund to eligible individuals in the order of date of birth (beginning
with the oldest individual on the date of the enactment of the Act)
until all eligible individuals have received payment in full. Eligible
individuals would receive payment in the sum of $150,000, which
would be paid out from the Fund.326 The surviving spouse or domestic partner, child, or parent of an eligible individual who is
deceased or incapacitated may receive payment on behalf of the
eligible individual. The Commission would notify all eligible individuals in writing of its decisions. Such notice would inform eligible
individuals that acceptance of payment would be considered full
settlement for all claims against the United States arising out of the
acts that formed the basis for their claims. Amounts paid to eligible
individuals from the Fund would be treated as damages for human
suffering by the Internal Revenue Service and would not be included as income or resources for purposes of determining
eligibility for any federal or state government services, benefits, or
entitlements. If an eligible individual refuses to accept payment, the
amount of that payment would remain in the Fund.
The Fund would terminate after all amounts that have been authorized for appropriation have been expended, including income
earned on such amounts, or six years from the Commission’s first
meeting, whichever is earlier. If all the amounts in the Fund have
325. By comparison, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 appropriated $1.25 billion for reparations; this was eventually increased to $1.65 billion. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4211–20 (West 2017); cf.
50 U.S.C.A. § 4201 (West 2017).
326. Cf. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4201 (this amount is significantly higher than the $20,000 payment
offered by the Civil Liberties Act of 1988).
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not been expended by the end of the six-year period, these
amounts would be deposited in the miscellaneous receipts account
in the Treasury.
The following timeline offers a graphic illustration of the implementation schedule for the Act’s key provisions.

TIMELINE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL REDRESS
HISTORICAL MEMORY ACT OF 2029

FOR

One year
from date
of first
meeting
Submission
First
of Initial
To be
Commission Report to
determined meeting
Congress
Completion
of identification of
eligible
individuals
Date of
Act’s
enactment

Within 90
days of
enactment

AND

Two years Three years Four years Five years
Six years
from first from first from first from first from first
meeting
meeting
meeting
meeting
meeting
Submission Submission Submission Submission
of Second
of Third
of Fourth
of Final
Report to
Report to
Report to
Report to Termination
Congress
Congress
Congress
Congress
of Fund
Completion
of payment
to eligible
individuals

Termination
of
Commission

The Act maintains an aggressive schedule for implementation. Eligible individuals have already experienced significant delays in
their search for redress. By requiring the identification of eligible
individuals and the completion of payments within two years, the
Act ensures that these individuals are not subject to further delays.
By requiring the Commission to submit a report to Congress that
offers recommendations for preventing such acts in the future
within two years, the Act seeks to influence policy in a prompt manner. By requiring the Commission to undertake and complete its
public education campaign within six years, the Act also ensures
that meaningful activities are promptly undertaken. Overall, this
schedule increases the likelihood that the Act will serve the needs
of victims, influence the historical record, and promote respect for
human rights without undue delay.

C. 2029 as Both Aspiration and Deadline
While the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 serves as an instructive
model, there are significant distinctions with the proposed Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029. The adoption of the Civil
Liberties Act stemmed from several factors, most of which cannot
readily be replicated.
The Civil Liberties Act was promoted by a coalition of community groups and prominent activists in the Japanese American
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community along with several political leaders who worked to publicize the injustices perpetrated during the Second World War and
place pressure on Congress to act. In fact, several members of Congress were detained in internment camps during the Second World
War. Their eloquent pleas to their colleagues in Congress influenced the adoption of the Civil Liberties Act. No comparable group
has yet emerged in Congress to lead the victims of the War on Terror in their own search for justice.
The Civil Liberties Act offered redress to individuals with strong
connections to the United States, including U.S. citizens and permanent residents. In contrast, victims in the War on Terror have
been predominantly foreign nationals.327 This distinction does not
mean they are less worthy of an apology, but it does mean that their
plight has been less noticeable: their distance from the American
polity has made it easier for Congress to disregard their suffering.
Quite simply, these foreign nationals have no constituency to voice
their claims or champion their cause.328 And, while the racist elements of Executive Order No. 9066 have not been explicitly
replicated, the majority of victims in the War on Terror have been
Muslims.329 Regrettably, this distinction has added even greater distance from some segments of the American polity.330 In this respect,
religious intolerance has replaced racial discrimination in perpetuating abuses.331
There is, however, one group of foreign nationals whose experiences during the Second World War can offer hope to foreign
nationals who were detained and abused during the War on Terror.
At the request of the United States, Latin American countries deported approximately 2,300 individuals of Japanese ancestry during
the Second World War.332 These Japanese Latin Americans were
not U.S. citizens or permanent residents. They were not enemy
aliens, and they did not pose any threat. Subsequently, the U.S. government placed them in internment camps and eventually
327. While several victims in the War on Terror have been U.S. citizens, U.S. courts have
also dismissed their claims.
328. As of October 2017, only two members of Congress are Muslim. See, e.g., Lauren
Victoria Burke, Muslim Members of Congress Speak on Hate in Era of Donald Trump, NBC NEWS
(May 24, 2016, 5:57 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/muslim-members-congress-speak-hate-era-donald-trump-n579631.
329. See Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists?: Race,
Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 31, 33 (2013).
330. See Hafetz, supra note 12, at 439.
331. See, e.g., LAURENCE ANDRE DOBROT, STRATEGIC STUD. INST., THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (2007), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB822.pdf; Adam Serwer, The War
Over the War on Terror, AM. PROSPECT (June 3, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/war-overwar-terror-0.
332. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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deported many of them to Japan, even though they had not committed any hostile acts.
The JLAs [Japanese Latin Americans] were completely innocent of wrongdoing. Most were model citizens. They were
kidnapped, torn from their families, imprisoned in another
country, and held hostage by the United States—because of
their race. . . . For a long time, the United States not only
refused to deal with these consequences, it simply denied that
it had orchestrated the debacle.333
While these Japanese Latin Americans were not eligible under the
terms of the Civil Liberties Act, some of them eventually received
an apology and reparations from the United States in the Mochizuki
settlement. But, even these remedies have been criticized as both
incomplete and discriminatory.334
Over forty years separated the end of the Second World War and
the adoption of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Such temporal distance is absent with the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of
2029 even though this Article does not anticipate adoption of the
Act for another twelve years. The human rights abuses committed
during the War on Terror began soon after September 11, 2001.
And, the conflict remains ongoing. Whether twelve years offers sufficient time for the United States to accept responsibility for its
actions is unclear.
Despite these obstacles, there are compelling reasons for pursuing the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act. By passing the
proposed legislation, Congress would place significant pressure on
the executive branch to offer victims redress. The executive branch
has long had the ability to offer ex gratia (or solatia) payments to
individuals harmed by the U.S. government without congressional
or judicial authorization.335 In fact, the United States has already
333. Eric Yamamoto, Reluctant Redress: The U.S. Kidnapping and Internment of Japanese Latin
Americans, in BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED 132, 135 (Martha Minow ed., 2002).
334. See Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97, 101 (1999) (Declaration of Kazuo
Matsubayashi: “I am told there are some Peruvian Japanese who are demanding the full redress as the other American Japanese received. I agree with them, although I also agree with
my family and cousins who all accepted being part of the settlement agreement. I do believe
the Peruvian Japanese were just as wrongfully treated as the American Japanese, and some
suffered a great deal.”); id. (Declaration of Sadaharu Sakamoto: “I support the settlement.
However, I do feel bad about it because I think we should receive the same amount, if not
more, as everyone else imprisoned in the U.S.”); see also Japanese Latin Americans Hearing,
supra note 278, at 11–22.
335. See generally Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy,
46 VA. J. INT’L L. 433 (2006). In 1999, for example, President Bill Clinton authorized a $4.5
million payment to China that would be distributed to victims of the 1999 U.S. missile strike
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offered ex gratia payments to a number of individuals harmed as a
result of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.336 Between
2005 and 2015, the United States disbursed approximately $4.8 million to Afghan nationals in ex gratia payments.337 These payments
covered death and personal injury as well as economic and noneconomic damages.338 While the United States has offered hundreds of such payments to civilian casualties in combat operations,
it has declined to offer comparable redress to other victims in the
War on Terror. If the executive branch continues to refuse to act,
Congress could do so.
In fact, the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act would be
preferable to the ex gratia payments that could be offered by the
on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. See Sean D. Murphy, State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 127 (2000). According to the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser,
the “payment will be entirely voluntary and does not acknowledge any legal liability. This
payment will not create any precedent.” Michael Laris, U.S. to Pay Embassy Bomb Victims, WASH.
POST, July 31, 1999, at A15. Subsequently, the United States and China concluded an agreement that would provide $28 million to China for damages to the Chinese Embassy. Michael
Laris, U.S. China Reach Deal on Embassy Payments, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1999, at A32. Unlike
the prior payments to the Chinese victims, this payment would be authorized by Congress. In
1988, President Reagan offered compensation to the families of individuals killed by a U.S.
missile strike on an Iran Air passenger jet in the Persian Gulf. See Marian Nash Leich, Denial
of Liability, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 319 (1989); Harold G. Maier, Payments and the Iranian Airline
Tragedy, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 325 (1989). In congressional testimony, the U.S. State Department
Legal Adviser noted the use of ex gratia payments in international practice and such payments
were recognized by international law. DEP’T ST. BULL., No. 2139, October 1988, at 58–59. In
his testimony, the Legal Adviser also described the manner in which such payments would be
calculated. “The level of compensation paid on an ex gratia basis is essentially within the
discretion of the state offering such payments. Obviously we are interested in providing significant humanitarian relief to the families of the victims, and we will be guided in part by
levels of ex gratia payments that have been made in the past.” Id. at 59.
336. See, e.g., Cora Currier, Our Condolences: How the U.S. Paid for Death and Damage in
Afghanistan, INTERCEPT (Feb. 27, 2015, 9:22 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/02/27/
payments-civilians-afghanistan/. See generally GAO, MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07699.pdf. Similar payments to casualties of U.S. combat
operations in Syria have also been proposed. Kate Brannen, Congress on Track to Extend Condolence Payments to Syrians, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 5, 2016, 11:22 AM), https://www.justsecurity.
org/35200/congress-track-extend-condolence-payments-syria/.
337. CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, EX-GRATIA PAYMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN: A CASE FOR
STANDING POLICY FOR THE U.S. MILITARY 1 (May 2015), https://civiliansinconflict.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/CIVIC_Exgratia_payments_2015_Brief.pdf; CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN
CONFLICT, UNITED STATES MILITARY COMPENSATION TO CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT (May
2010), https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CENTER_Condol
ence_White_Paper_2010.pdf.
338. See generally AMSTERDAM INT’L LAW CLINIC, MONETARY PAYMENTS FOR CIVILIAN HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PRACTICE (2013), http://www.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/
subsites/amsterdam-international-law-clinic/valuation_oct1_final-front.pdf; CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, MONETARY PAYMENTS FOR CIVILIAN HARM IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
PRACTICE (October 2013), https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Val
uation_Graphics_Final__Oct_2013.pdf.
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executive branch. Unlike the ad hoc process required for ex gratia
payments, the Act offers a broader and more systematic response. It
establishes a formal process for identifying eligible individuals, investigating claims, and offering reparations and an apology to
eligible individuals. Significantly, the Act removes reparation decisions from the executive branch and places them in a body whose
goal is to promote redress and memory. It also creates a record of
abuses, offers recommendations to prevent future abuses, and promotes an educational campaign to highlight the importance of
human rights.
The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act is also preferable to
litigation, where victims pursue individualized relief. Lawsuits provide an ad hoc mechanism for redress that require victims to
initiate litigation, attorneys willing to represent them (on a pro
bono or contingency basis), and a receptive judiciary. In contrast,
the Act creates a separate process that removes most of the obstacles that now confront victims in their search for justice. Under the
Act, there is no need for victims to find lawyers to represent them.
Unlike complex and lengthy litigation, the Act offers a streamlined
process for redress. Moreover, the Act also removes most of the procedural barriers that have prevented victims from seeking redress
through litigation. For example, the Commission favors individuals
when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding eligibility determinations. And, significantly, any
department or agency’s refusal to comply with the Commission’s
request for information or failure to produce documents will create
a rebuttable presumption that the information would have been of
benefit to the individual and would support their eligibility claim.
Finally, the Act would provide more meaningful remedies, including an apology, a historical record, and the development of a public
education program. Indeed, the public education program is particularly significant because it can promote meaningful change,
both in the United States and abroad.

CONCLUSION
The struggle of victims in the War on Terror to seek redress for
past harms is not unique. International practice reveals a sparse history of state reflection and redress in response to past injustices. As
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evidenced by the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, there are some exceptions.339 But typically, countries discount the past and seek to
minimize their own misconduct.
The struggle to protect human rights must be both retrospective
and prospective.340 It is about accepting responsibility, acknowledging past injustices, and providing redress for harms that were
inflicted.341 It is also about creating a narrative of respect for human
rights to prevent future harms. The Civil Redress and Historical
Memory Act of 2029 serves both these ends. By adopting it, the
United States would accept responsibility for harming innocent
people who were detained and abused in the all-encompassing War
on Terror. Not only does the Act offer an apology and reparations
as an acknowledgment of responsibility, but it also forces us to remember. It seeks to learn from the past so that such harms are
never repeated.

339. See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL 249–77 (2001); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNTRUTHS (2d ed. 2010); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS
91–117 (1998); TAKING WRONGS SERIOUSLY 153–331 (Elazar Barkan & Alexander Karn eds.,
2006) (detailing different case studies in acknowledging past injustices). The Holocaust restitution movement offers a distinct approach. See generally MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST
JUSTICE (2003); STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE (2003).
340. Numerous human rights organizations have called upon the United States to offer
redress to victims in the War on Terror. See, e.g., GLOB. JUSTICE CLINIC, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW,
REPARATION & APOLOGY (2015), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IACHR_
HR-Situation-of-People-Affected-by-RDI_Reparations-and-Apology-102315.pdf; LISA MAGARRELL & LORNA PETERSON, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AFTER TORTURE (2010),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-USA-Right-Redress-2010-English.pdf.
341. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads,
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2007).
SPEAKABLE
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APPENDIX
AN ACT
TO ESTABLISH THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL REDRESS AND
HISTORICAL MEMORY AND ACCOMPANYING FUND
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the “Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act of 2029.”

SECTION 102. PURPOSES
The purposes of this Act are to:
(1) authorize a commission of inquiry to investigate and determine the facts surrounding cases involving the detention
and mistreatment of individuals during the War on Terror;
(2) acknowledge the fundamental injustices committed against
those individuals who did not engage in hostilities during
the War on Terror and were neither terrorists nor associated
with any terror groups and yet were detained and mistreated
abroad by the United States, or by another country with the
complicity of the United States, any time between September
1, 2001 and the date of enactment of this Act, and who were
subsequently released and never charged or convicted by the
United States;
(3) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for
these actions;
(4) provide reparations to these individuals;
(5) offer recommendations so that the causes and circumstances
regarding these cases are better understood and never repeated; and
(6) establish a public education fund to finance efforts to publicize the commission’s findings and highlight the significance
of human rights.
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CONGRESS

The Congress recognizes a fundamental injustice was done to individuals who did not engage in hostilities during the War on
Terror and were neither terrorists nor associated with any terror
groups and yet were detained and mistreated abroad by the United
States, or by other countries with the complicity of the United
States, any time between September 1, 2001 and the date of enactment of this Act, and who were subsequently released and never
charged or convicted by the United States. For these fundamental
violations of basic civil liberties and human rights, the Congress
apologizes on behalf of the nation.

TITLE I – COMMISSION

ON

CIVIL REDRESS

SECTION 101. ESTABLISHMENT

AND

OF THE

HISTORICAL MEMORY
COMMISSION

(a) In General
There is established the Commission on Civil Redress and Historical Memory (in this Act referred to as the Commission).

(b) Composition
The Commission shall be composed of nine members, who shall
be appointed within sixty days from the date of the enactment of
this Act, of whom—
(1) three members shall be appointed by the President;
(2) three members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, on the joint recommendation of
the majority leader of the House of Representatives and the
minority leader of the House of Representatives; and
(3) three members shall be appointed by the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate, on the joint recommendation of the
majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the
Senate.
Commission members may not be officers or employees of the
United States Government.
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(c) Compensation
(1) Members of the Commission shall serve without pay.
(2) Members of the Commission shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses
incurred by them in carrying out the functions of the Commission, in the same manner as persons employed
intermittently in the United States Government are allowed
expenses under section 5703 of Title 5, United States Code.

(d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies
Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A
vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be
filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made.

(e) Meetings
(1) The President shall call, and the Commission shall hold, the
first meeting of the Commission within ninety days from the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Following its first meeting, the Commission shall meet at the
call of the Chairperson of the Commission.

(f) Quorum
Five members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but
a lesser number of members may hold hearings.

(g) Chairperson and Vice Chairperson
At its first meeting, the Commission shall elect a Chairperson
and Vice Chairperson from among its members. The Chairperson
and Vice Chairperson shall serve for the life of the Commission.
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COMMISSION

(a) In General
The Commission shall—
(1) investigate and determine the facts in cases of individuals
who did not engage in hostilities during the War on Terror
and were neither terrorists nor associated with any terror
groups and yet were detained and mistreated abroad by the
United States, or by other countries with the complicity of
the United States, any time between September 1, 2001 and
the date of enactment of this Act, and who were subsequently released and never charged or convicted by the
United States;
(2) provide reparations to these individuals;
(3) offer recommendations so that the causes and circumstances
regarding these cases are better understood and never
repeated;
(4) distribute its findings and recommendations to the general
public; and
(5) develop and implement a public education program to inform the public about human rights.

(b) Reporting Requirements
(1) Within twelve months of its first meeting, the Commission
shall submit an initial report to Congress describing its work
and the status of its inquiry.
(2) Within twenty-four months of its first meeting, the Commission shall submit a report to Congress that examines the
causes and circumstances regarding these cases of arbitrary
detention and mistreatment committed by the United States
during the War on Terror. The report shall include a set of
recommendations that address how such acts can be prevented from reoccurring.
(3) Thereafter, the Commission shall submit periodic reports to
Congress every twelve months and a final report within five
years of its first meeting.
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SECTION 103. REPARATIONS PROGRAM
(a) Identification of Eligible Individuals
(1) The Commission is responsible for identifying and locating
eligible individuals for reparations.
(2) Individuals may notify the Commission that they are candidates for eligibility. A spouse, domestic partner, child, or
parent may also make a notification on behalf of an individual who is deceased or incapacitated.
(3) The Commission may delegate the identification and location of eligible individuals to the Attorney General although
the Commission shall make the final decision on eligibility.
(4) The identification and location of all eligible individuals
shall begin with the first meeting of the Commission and
shall be completed within twelve months of that initial
meeting.
(5) All payments to eligible individuals shall be completed
within twenty-four months of the initial meeting of the
Commission.

(b) Definition of Eligible Individual
(1) An eligible individual is defined as any individual who did
not engage in hostilities during the War on Terror and was
neither a terrorist nor associated with any terror groups and
yet was detained and mistreated abroad by the United States,
or by another country with the complicity of the United
States, any time between September 1, 2001 and the date of
enactment of this Act, and who was subsequently released
and never charged or convicted by the United States. For
purposes of the Act, mistreatment is defined as the violation
of any internationally recognized human rights, including
arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, torture, or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.
(2) Individuals who have accepted and received payment pursuant to an award of a final judgment or a settlement on a
claim against the United States for such detention and mistreatment shall not be eligible.
(3) The Commission has exclusive authority to determine
whether someone is an eligible individual. The Commission
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shall compile an administrative record that documents its
decision-making regarding each individual it considers for
eligibility.
(4) When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue that is material
to the determination of eligibility, the Commission shall offer the benefit of the doubt to the individual in resolving
such issue.
(5) If any department or agency refuses to comply with the Commission’s request for information or the production of
documents, it shall create a rebuttable presumption that the
information would have benefitted the individual in determining eligibility.
(6) Decisions on eligibility shall require a majority vote of the
Commission.

(c) Judicial Review
(1) Anyone whose claim is denied by the Commission may seek
judicial review of such denial solely in the United States
Court of Federal Claims.
(2) Judicial review of such denials shall be based on the administrative record.
(3) The court shall set aside the denial if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.

(d) Assistance of the Attorney General
(1) The Commission shall be assisted by the Attorney General in
identifying and locating eligible individuals.
(2) The Attorney General will use funds and resources that are
regularly available to the Attorney General for these efforts.
(3) In attempting to locate any eligible individual, the Attorney
General may use any facility or resource of any public or
nonprofit organization or any other record, document, or
information that may be made available to the Attorney
General.
(4) No costs incurred by the Attorney General in carrying out its
responsibilities under this section shall be paid from the
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Fund or set off against, or otherwise deducted from, any payment under this section to any eligible individual.
(5) The duties of the Attorney General shall cease one year after
final payment is made to the last eligible individual identified by the Commission.

SECTION 104. PUBLIC EDUCATION PROGRAM
The Commission shall develop and oversee a public education
program that will be used to inform the public about human rights.
This work can comprise a variety of activities, including educational
programs for primary, secondary, and university students and competitive grants for academic research, artistic projects, and
community outreach. These projects can take place in the United
States and abroad, and project applicants need not be U.S. citizens.
The Commission shall coordinate its efforts with federal agencies
and departments, including the Department of Justice, Department
of State, and Department of Education.

SECTION 105. POWERS

OF THE

COMMISSION

(a) Hearings
The Commission or, at its direction, any subcommittee or member of the Commission, may, for the purpose of carrying out this
Act—
(1) hold such public or private hearings in such cities and countries, sit and act at such times and places, take such
testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths
as the Commission or such subcommittee or member considers advisable; and
(2) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, documents,
tapes, and materials as the Commission or such subcommittee or member considers advisable.
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(b) Issuance and Enforcement of Subpoenas
(1) Issuance
Subpoenas issued under subsection (a) shall be approved by a
majority of the members present at a meeting, shall bear the signature of the Chairperson of the Commission, and shall be served by
any person or class of persons designated by the Chairperson for
that purpose.

(2) Enforcement
In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena, the
United States district court for the judicial district in which the person who is served the subpoena resides, is served, or may be found
may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence
required by the subpoena. Any failure to obey the order of the
court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

(c) Witness Allowances and Fees
Section 1821 of Title 28, United States Code, shall apply to witnesses requested or required by subpoena to appear at any hearing
of the Commission. The per diem and mileage allowances provided
under such section for witnesses shall be paid from funds available
to pay the expenses of the Commission.

(d) Information from Federal Agencies
The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission considers
necessary to perform its duties. Upon request by the Chairperson of
the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission. Subject to appropriate
clearance requirements and security procedures, the Commission
shall be provided access to classified documents. If any department
or agency refuses to comply with the Commission’s request for information or the production of documents, it shall create a
rebuttable presumption that the information would have been of
benefit to the individual in determining eligibility.
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(e) Information from Congress
(1) The Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary
of the Senate are authorized to permit the Archivist of the
United States to make available for use by the Commission
any congressional records not classified for national security
purposes relating to the detention and mistreatment of U.S.
citizens and foreign nationals during the War on Terror.
Subject to appropriate clearance requirements and security
procedures, the Commission shall be provided access to classified documents.
(2) This subsection is enacted as an exercise of the rulemaking
powers of the House of Representatives and Senate, but is
applicable only with respect to the availability of records to
which it applies, and is enacted with full recognition of the
constitutional right of the House and Senate to change their
rules at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the House or Senate.

(f) Postal Services
The Commission may use the United States mails in the same
manner and under the same conditions as other departments and
agencies of the Federal Government.

SECTION 106. PERSONNEL

AND

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

(a) Travel Expenses
The members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates
authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of Title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes
or regular places of business in the performance of their duties for
the Commission.
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(b) Staff
(1) In General
The Chairperson of the Commission may, without regard to the
civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate the employment of such personnel as may be necessary to enable the
Commission to perform its duties.
(2) Compensation
The Chairperson of the Commission may fix the compensation
of the personnel without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of Title 5, United States Code, relating to classification
of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of
pay for the personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of
the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
(c) Detail of Government Employees
Any employee of the Federal Government may be detailed to the
Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.
(d) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services
The Chairperson of the Commission may procure temporary and
intermittent services under section 3109(b) of Title 5, United States
Code, at rates for individuals that do not exceed the daily
equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of
the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
(e) Other Administrative Matters
The Commission may—
(1) enter into agreements with the Administrator of General
Services to procure necessary financial and administrative
services;
(2) enter into contracts to procure supplies, services, and property; and

FALL 2017]

The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Act

233

(3) enter into contracts with Federal, State, and local agencies,
and private institutions and organizations, for the conduct of
research or surveys, the preparation of reports, and other activities necessary to enable the Commission to perform its
duties.

SECTION 107. PRESERVATION

OF

DOCUMENTS

IN

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

All documents, personal testimony, and other records created or
received by the Commission during its inquiry shall be kept and
maintained by the Archivist of the United States who shall preserve
such documents, testimony, and records in the National Archives of
the United States. The Archivist shall make such documents, testimony, and records available to the public for research purposes.
Classified documents shall not be released. However, the Commission will request declassification by the appropriate government
agencies of all relevant documents.

SECTION 108. AUTHORIZATION

OF

APPROPRIATIONS

(a) In General
Congress authorizes the appropriation of $20 million to fund the
operations of the Commission and additional sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to
this section are authorized to remain available until expended.

(b) Availability
Any sums appropriated under the authorization contained in this
section shall remain available, without fiscal year limitation, until
expended.

SECTION 109. TERMINATION
The Commission shall cease to function one year after its final
report is submitted to Congress.
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SECTION 110. DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this title:
(1) The term “eligible individual” is defined as any individual
who did not engage in hostilities during the War on Terror
and was neither a terrorist nor associated with any terror
groups and yet was detained and mistreated abroad by the
United States, or by another country with the complicity of
the United States, any time between September 1, 2001 and
the date of enactment of this Act, and who was subsequently
released and never charged or convicted by the United
States.
(2) The term “mistreatment” is defined as the violation of any
internationally recognized human rights, including arbitrary
detention, forced disappearance, torture, or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment.
(3) The term “Fund” is defined as the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Fund.
(4) The term “Commission” is defined as the Commission on
Civil Redress and Historical Memory.

TITLE II – CIVIL REDRESS

AND

HISTORICAL MEMORY FUND

SECTION 101. TRUST FUND
(a) Establishment
The Civil Redress and Historical Memory Fund shall be established in the Treasury of the United States and shall be
administered by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(b) Investment of Amounts in the Fund
Amounts in the Fund shall be invested in accordance with section 9702 of Title 31, United States Code.

(c) Uses of the Fund
Amounts in the Fund shall be available—
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(1) to provide reparations payments to eligible individuals as authorized by the Commission; and
(2) to develop and implement the public education program to
publicize the commission’s findings and inform the public
about human rights.

(d) Authorization of Appropriations
Congress authorizes the appropriation of $100,000,000 for the
Fund. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to this section are authorized to remain available until expended.

(e) Termination
The Fund will terminate after all amounts that have been authorized for appropriation have been expended, including income
earned on such amounts, or six years from the first meeting of the
Commission, whichever is earlier. If all the amounts in the Fund
have not been expended by the end of the six-year period, such
amounts shall be deposited in the miscellaneous receipts account
in the Treasury.

SECTION 102. REPARATIONS
(a) Payment to Eligible Individuals
(1) In General
Subject to paragraph (5) and the availability of funds appropriated for such purpose, the Commission shall pay out of the Fund to
each eligible individual the sum of $150,000, unless such individual
refuses to accept the payment, in the manner described in paragraph (3).

(2) Notice from the Commission
The Commission shall, when funds are appropriated to the Fund
for payments to an eligible individual under this section, notify that
eligible individual in writing of his or her eligibility for payment
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under this section. Such notice shall inform the eligible individual
that—
(A) acceptance of payment under this section shall be in full settlement of all claims against the United States arising out of
acts described in section 103(1); and
(B) each eligible individual who does not refuse, in the manner
described in paragraph (3), to accept payment under this
section within 12 months after receiving such written notice
shall be deemed to have accepted payment for purposes of
paragraph (4).

(3) Effect of refusal to accept payment
If an eligible individual refuses, in a written document filed with
the Commission, to accept any payment under this section, the
amount of such payment shall remain in the Fund and no payment
may be made under this section to such individual at any time after
such refusal.

(4) Payment in full settlement of claims against the United States
The acceptance of payment by an eligible individual under this
section shall be in full settlement of all claims against the United
States arising out of acts described in section 103(1). This paragraph shall apply to any eligible individual who does not refuse, in
the manner described in paragraph (3), to accept payment under
this section within eighteen months after receiving the notification
from the Commission referred to in paragraph (3).

(5) Exclusion of certain individuals
No payment may be made under this section to any individual
who accepted or received payment pursuant to an award of a final
judgment or a settlement on a claim against the United States for
acts described in section 103(1), or to any surviving spouse, domestic partner, child, or parent of such individual to whom paragraph
(6) applies.
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(6) Payments in the case of deceased persons
(A) In the case of an eligible individual who is deceased at the
time of payment under this section, such payment shall be
made only as follows:
(i) If the eligible individual is survived by a spouse or domestic partner who is living at the time of payment,
such payment shall be made to such individual.
(ii) If there is no surviving spouse or domestic partner as
described in clause (i), such payment shall be made in
equal shares to all children of the eligible individual
who are living at the time of payment.
(iii) If there is no surviving spouse or domestic partner as
described in clause (i) and if there are no children described in clause (ii), such payment shall be made in
equal shares to the parents of the eligible individual
who are living at the time of payment.
(iv) If there is no surviving spouse or domestic partner, children, or parents as described in clauses (i), (ii), and
(iii), the amount of such payment shall remain in the
Fund, and may be used only for the purposes set forth
in section 101(c)(2).
(B) After the death of an eligible individual, this subsection and
subsection (c) shall apply to the individual or individuals
specified in subparagraph (A) to whom payment under this
section will be made, to the same extent as such subsections
apply to the eligible individual.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) a “child” of an eligible individual includes a recognized
natural child, a stepchild who lived with the eligible individual in a regular parent-child relationship, and an
adopted child; and
(ii) a “parent” of an eligible individual includes fathers and
mothers through adoption.

(b) Order of Payments
The Commission shall endeavor to make payments under this
section to eligible individuals in the order of date of birth (beginning with the oldest individual on the date of the enactment of this
Act) until all eligible individuals have received payment in full.
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(c) Clarification of Treatment of Payments Under Other Laws
Amounts paid to an eligible individual—
(1) shall be treated for purposes of the internal revenue laws of
the United States as damages for human suffering; and
(2) shall not be included as income or resources for purposes of
determining eligibility to receive benefits described in section 3803(c)(2)(C) of Title 31, United States Code or
available under any other law administered by the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs, or for purposes of determining the
amount of such benefits.
(d) Liability of United States Limited to Amount in Fund
(1) General Rule
An eligible individual may be paid under this section only from
amounts in the Fund.
(2) Coordination with Other Provisions
Nothing in this title shall authorize the payment to an eligible
individual by the United States Government of any amount authorized by this section from any source other than the Fund.
(3) Order in Which Unpaid Claims to be Paid
If at any time the Fund has insufficient funds to pay all eligible
individuals at such time, such eligible individuals shall, to the extent permitted under paragraph (1), be paid in full in the order
specified in subsection (b).
SECTION 103. DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this title:
(1) The term “eligible individual” is defined as any individual
who did not engage in hostilities during the War on Terror
and was neither a terrorist nor associated with any terror
groups and yet was detained and mistreated abroad by the
United States, or by another country with the complicity of
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the United States, any time between September 1, 2001 and
the date of enactment of this Act, and who was subsequently
released and never charged or convicted by the United
States.
(2) The term “Fund” is defined as the Civil Redress and Historical Memory Fund.
(3) The term “Commission” is defined as the Commission on
Civil Redress and Historical Memory.

